This article first appeared at Yahoo Finance and link is below. https://finance.yahoo.com/news/nyc-pledges-65-million-taxi-163158992.htmlNYC Pledges $65 Million of Taxi Aid That Drivers Call ‘Horrible’Henry GoldmanTue, March 9, 2021, 11:31 AM·1 min read(Bloomberg) -- New York City is creating a $65 million fund to help taxi medallion owners, but drivers called the plan “a disgraceful betrayal from a city that already has blood on its hands.”The proposal, funded with federal stimulus money, will offer $20,000 loans to help restructure debts on taxi medallions, and as much as $9,000 in debt payment support, said Taxi and Limousine Commissioner Aloysee Heredia Jarmoszuk.“I think this new plan will be a difference maker for many drivers,” Mayor Bill de Blasio said Tuesday.But Bhairavi Desai, executive director of the 21,000-member Taxi Workers Alliance, said the plan is “horrible” and “does absolutely nothing for us.”“It’s a cash bailout for lenders while we are left to drown in debt, foreclosure & bankruptcy,” Desai said in a Twitter post. “No debt forgiveness. No collective solution. No justice.”In response, the mayor said, “It’s very easy to call for plans that aren’t going to work. Our job is to come up with solutions that will actually work.”Read more here: N.Y. Attorney General Seeks $810 Million From NYC for Taxi Fraud and here: Suicides, Traffic Hell in NYC Spur Second Look at Uber’s GrowthThe market for taxi operating permits known as medallions has collapsed with the onset of the digital ride-hailing industry, leaving thousands of drivers facing financial ruin. Several have committed suicide.The Alliance has called on the city to help convince and incentivize lenders to restructure their debt.

Proposed changes to bankruptcy laws could help struggling familiesTags: 5 On Your Side, bankruptcy, consumerPosted February 26, 2021 5:25 p.m. EST Updated February 26, 2021 5:46 p.m. EST By Monica Laliberte, WRAL executive producer/5 on Your Side reporter Monthly bills remain … News: WRAL- Proposed changes to bankruptcy laws could help struggling families Read More »

Abstract: The law of data breaches is new, dynamic, and evolving. The number and complexity of breaches increases each year and legal scholars, courts, and policymakers scramble to respond. In 2019, 14.4 million consumers became victims of identity theft, the … Law Review: Greene, Sara Sternberg, Stealing (Identity) From the Poor (February 8, 2021). Read More »

Executive Summary: In 2020, those who have fallen behind at least three months on their mortgage increased 250 percent to over 2 million households, and is now at a level not seen since the height of the Great Recession in … CFPB Report: Housing insecurity and the COVID-19 pandemic Read More »

Summary: The Debtor owns a 2012 Clayton mobile home which she acquired approximately 507 days prior to filing bankruptcy. Arguing that the Hanging Paragraph of 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5) allowed the cram-down of any thing of value other than a … Bankr. M.D.N.C: In re St. Fleur- Mobile Home is not a Motor Vehicle under Federal Law Read More »

Summary: Mortgage Servicers argued that the bankruptcy court was limited to submitting proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district court for de novo review unless the parties consent to the bankruptcy court hearing and determining the … Bankr. M.D.N.C.: Bivens v. NewRez- Authority of Bankruptcy Court to Enter Final Order for Discharge and Stay Violations Read More »

The crime of vehicular homicide can be complicated even more so by an accusation of the driver being under the influence of alcohol or drugs during the time that the crime was committed. The Bucks County homicide defense attorneys at Young, Marr & Associates explore the potential penalties – including jail time, fines, and sentencing […] The post What are the Penalties for Homicide by Vehicle While Driving Under the Influence (Pennsylvania) appeared first on .

   Regarding a matter in which there is a split of opinions Judge Halfenger ruled that the fees due to debtor's counsel to be paid through the chapter 13 plan reduced the amount required to be paid to unsecured creditors to meet the best interest of creditors test.  In re Buettner, 2021 Bankr. LEXIS 363, Case No 20-24696-GMH (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 16 February 2021).     The best interest of creditors test comes from 11 U.S.C. §1325(a)(4), also called the liquidation test.  This test requires that a chapter 13 plan pay allowed unsecured claims at least as much as they would receive in a hypothetical chapter 7 liquidation.  In the case at bar, the parties agreed Debtor had approximately $10,301.88 in nonexempt assets, and the chapter 7 trustee fee would be approximately $1,780.19, leaving  about $8,000 available to pay unsecured creditors if the case had originally been filed as a chapter 7 case.  The debtor asserted that the $4,486 debtor counsel fees must also be deducted.  The Court noted that allowed administrative expenses in a chapter 13 may include compensation to debtor's counsel under 11 U.S.C. §330(a)(4)(B).  Such compensation must be allowed a priority claim if the case is converted to chapter 7.  11 U.S.C. §§507(a)(2) & 726(a)(1).  The crux of the issue is whether the liquidation test compares a hypothetical 7 case in lieu of the filing of the chapter 13, or acknowledging the filing of the 13 and associated administrative expenses.  Pursuant to §1325(a)(4) the date of the test is 'the effective date of the plan.'   The Supreme Court has defined this term in a chapter 13 case to be the date the plan is confirmed.1   Further, as a practical matter a confirmed plan cannot be rewound back to the filing of the petition, but can only be modified or the case converted.    While no fee application had been filed in this case, the amount is not greater than the court's presumptively reasonable fee, and no objections to the fee had been filed.  Thus, when the plan is confirmed such fees will be allowed as an administrative expense in the chapter 13 case.  However, the plan provides that all attorneys fees will be paid prior to any payment to unsecured creditors, causing such unsecured creditors to have to wait over a year after confirmation before they start receiving payment on their claims.  Thus, due to the time value of money, creditors are not being paid the amount they would receive if the estate were liquidated in chapter 7.  The court denied confirmation on the basis of the delayed payment to unsecured creditors, allowing the debtor to file an amended plan.1 Hamilton v Lanning, 560 U.S. 505, 518, 130 S.Ct. 2464, 177 L.Ed.2d 23 (2010).↩Michael BarnettMichael Barnett, PA506 N Armenia AveTampa, FL 33609-1703813 870-3100https://hillsboroughbankruptcy.com   

A new decision from the Fifth Circuit holds that implied consent cannot overcome a formal denial of consent to entry of a final judgment by a magistrate judge, even when the objecting party expressly consented.  PNC Bank v. Ruiz, Case No. 20-50255 (5th Cir. 3/3/2021), which can be accessed here.  The decision is of interest to bankruptcy lawyers because the issue of consent is common to the actions of both bankruptcy judges and magistrate judges.Following Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462 (2011), bankruptcy courts retained most of their ability to function as normal. However, the bankruptcy courts could not enter a final judgment in a matter which was not directly tied to the restructuring of the debtor-creditor relationship absent consent of the parties. In those cases, the bankruptcy court could submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions to the district court which would have the authority to enter judgment. Thus, if a matter falls within the Stern ruling, the options are that the bankruptcy court may enter a final judgment with consent or it must submit proposed findings and conclusions to the district court.  Examples of matters which fall within the Stern doctrine are counterclaims to proofs of claim which seek affirmative relief against the non-debtor party, suits by a trustee under state law and fraudulent transfer claims.The jurisdiction for magistrate judges to enter final judgments is also based on consent. A magistrate judge may only enter a final judgment if the parties have consented. What HappenedIn PNC Bank, a bank filed suit in federal court seeking to foreclose a lien securing a Texas home equity loan. The Bank filed a statement in which it objected to entry of a final judgment by a magistrate.  The clerk mistakenly said that PNC had consented rather than objecting. Mrs. Ruiz, on the other hand, did consent.Some time later, PNC obtained new counsel and filed a motion for summary judgment. It apparently did not realize that it had previously denied its consent. The motion was referred to a magistrate judge based upon the erroneous docket notation. Mrs. Ruiz did not object to the magistrate judge's authority to enter a final judgment. The magistrate ruled in favor of the bank. At that point, Mrs. Ruiz realized the glitch in the process and appealed based on lack of authority to enter a final judgment. The Fifth Circuit's RulingIn an opinion written by Kurt Engelhardt (who was appointed to the District Court bench by President George W. Bush and to the Fifth Circuit by President Trump), the court ruled that the magistrate lacked authority to enter the final judgment. While consent may be implied from a party's conduct, it cannot overcome an express statement of lack of consent (even if the non-consenting party would have likely changed its election if it knew about the issue). Thus, the judgment was reversed and the case was remanded to the district court.The court recognized that Mrs. Ruiz was trying to overturn a decision by a magistrate whose authority she had consented to.  Nevertheless, it was too important of an issue to ignore. Judge Engelhardt wrote:To be sure, dismissing this appeal for lack of jurisdiction seemingly rewards what might be characterized as gamesmanship on the part of Ruiz. See Hester v. Graham, Bright & Smith, P.C., 289 F. App’x 35, 40 (5th Cir. 2008) (“Allowing parties to object to a [magistrate judge] and insist upon a new trial only when he issues an order unfavorable to them would allow a ‘gamesmanship’ of the system that the Supreme Court has sought to avoid.”). In other contexts, indeed, she might be estopped by her own acquiescence from now asserting PNC’s failure to consent. But not where, as here, fundamental questions of jurisdiction are involved. See Coury v. Prot, 85 F.3d 244, 248 (5th Cir. 1996) (noting that “parties can never consent to federal subject matter jurisdiction, and lack of such jurisdiction is a defense which cannot be waived.”). Besides, we must raise the jurisdictional issue sua sponte if necessary. See Union Planters Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Salih, 369 F.3d 457, 460 (5th Cir. 2004) (“[F]ederal courts are duty-bound to examine the basis of subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte, even on appeal.”). We also recognize that gamesmanship is a two-way street, and, if the shoe were on the other foot, PNC might now be claiming non-consent based on its own initial refusal. Accordingly, inferring consent under these facts would not categorically eliminate the possibility of gamesmanship under similar circumstances with a different posture in future cases.  Opinion, pp. 6-7. What Does It Mean?So what did Mrs. Ruiz gain from her appeal? The legal answer is that she received a do-over. The motion for summary judgment will now be considered by the district judge. The district judge will likely rule the same way that the magistrate judge did unless there was a glaring defect in the magistrate's ruling. Maybe the do-over will allow Mrs. Ruiz to present arguments which were not originally presented to the magistrate judge. However, practicality is that district judges are busy people. When another judge, be it a magistrate judge or a bankruptcy judge, has taken the trouble to examine a legal issue in detail, the district judge is likely to reach the same decision. Thus, barring something unexpected like a winning argument that was not presented to the magistrate judge, Mrs. Ruiz will have only obtained a delay. There is a value to time. Perhaps Mrs. Ruiz won the lottery in the interim and will be able to pay off the house. Perhaps she would be able to file chapter 13 now when she could not have before. Maybe she just delayed the inevitable. This case illustrates the consequence of Stern (and similar decisions affecting magistrate judges). The consent regime did not eliminate the effectiveness of bankruptcy judges and magistrate judges. Instead, it merely created new procedural pathways which must be followed and which can create traps for the unwary.  

The Small Business Reorganization Act of 2019 (the “SBRA”) provides an expedited, simpler and less expensive route through chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code for small businesses. Plus, it preserves the owners’ equity interest in their company; even without paying creditors what they are owed. Initially, to qualify as a small business the debtor could have no more than $2,725,625 of debt. Responding to the Coronavirus Pandemic, Congress passed the CARES Act. The CARES Act recognized the SBRA’s debt cap was unrealistic. So, the CARES Act increased the cap to $7, 500,000. However, this increase lasts only until March 27, 2021.  Congress has yet to extend the increased cap beyond March 27, 2021. The Pandemic severely injured many business and their owners. Chapter 11 provides a means of reorganizing and rehabilitating businesses and their owners. You or your business may be considering reorganizing through chapter 11, If the debt exceeds $2,725,625, you should confer with a bankruptcy professional immediately. Otherwise, you will probably lose a remarkable tool to preserve your business or yourself, Remember, “Bankruptcy is a strategy for success.” If it can work for you, use it. The post Small Business Reorganization Act Deadline! appeared first on Wayne Greenwald, P.C..