Bankruptcy Substitutes and How You Can Settle Your Debts Understanding the Variety of Bankruptcy Substitute Options A lot of people think of bankruptcy as a last-resort option – mistakenly, since it can provide profound debt relief and help you restart your financial life faster than just about any other option. However, most people are persuaded by misconceptions about bankruptcy, and they look at other alternatives for resolving their debt before they are willing to talk to a bankruptcy attorney in Gilbert about their options. Here are some of the common options that many people pursue before they finally realize that talking to a Gilbert bankruptcy lawyer is going to be their best option: Negotiate Directly with Your Creditors If you are struggling to pay your bills, you may be juggling which creditors actually get paid each month. You may trade off, paying some one month and then others the next. Or you may just stop paying one while you take care of another until it’s paid off. Your creditors may be willing to lower the interest rate you pay or suspend your payments for a time if they know there’s a chance you might not be able to pay them at all. Call your credit card companies, medical provider, or bank lender to find out what’s possible. Some may even have programs that provide assistance if you are experiencing hardship. Just know that many creditors are going to be less willing to negotiate than you might think. They know they have legal options to get the debt paid, and they are going to want to get paid everything they can. Many are going to play hard ball, leaving you with few options. Work with a Credit Counseling Agency Credit counseling agencies can help you negotiate with your creditors, and they can give you advice about handling your debt and your finances. If you do file for bankruptcy eventually, you will have to take a credit counseling course anyway, so this is valuable information. However, credit counseling agencies are limited in what they can do to help you. Some organizations that pose as credit counseling agencies can actually take money from you without delivering results. They promise the world, but they just create more financial trouble for you. Do your research and tread carefully if you want to work with a credit counseling agency. Attempt a Debt Settlement You may hit the point that you can no longer maintain your credit cards. You want to cancel them instead of defaulting on them. You can call your credit card companies and offer a settlement. For example, you may say that you can pay $100 a month for a certain number of months. You may also be able to offer to pay only a portion of what you owe. The company may be willing to do this in order to get something for your debt rather than the nothing you might end up paying them if they refuse to settle. However, the debt will go on your credit report as a default, even if you do pay it off over time and even if you do pay all of it. But remember: Not all companies are going to be willing to even discuss this possibility with you. You’ll find after pursuing these options for settling your debts that your best option truly is bankruptcy. When you file for bankruptcy, you do not have to ask your creditors for permission. You don’t have to rely on their goodwill. You work directly with a Glendale bankruptcy attorney and judge to have your debts discharged completely or to determine what you can pay. The bankruptcy will be a hit to your credit initially, but you’ll be able to start rebuilding your credit quickly. In many cases, you’ll restore your credit more quickly by filing for bankruptcy in Glendale than you would by continuing to struggle with high credit balances and late payments. Call My AZ Lawyers today to talk with a bankruptcy attorney about your options for debt relief. We represent individuals seeking relief through Chapter 7 bankruptcy and Chapter 13 bankruptcy. We’ll analyze your finances and help you understand which bankruptcy option would give you the most benefits, then we’ll put together the paperwork to push the filing through as quickly as possible so you can start getting the debt relief you need. Call us in Phoenix today to schedule a consultation with a Gilbert bankruptcy attorney. Arizona Offices: Mesa Location: 1731 West Baseline Rd., Suite #100 Mesa, AZ 85202 Office: (480) 448-9800 Email: info@myazlawyers.com Website: https://myazlawyers.com/ Glendale Location: 20325 N 51st Avenue Suite #134, Building 5 Glendale, AZ 85308 Office: (602) 509-0955 Tucson Location: 2 East Congress St., Suite #900-6A Tucson, AZ 85701 Office: (520) 441-1450 Avondale Location: 12725 W. Indian School Rd., Ste E, #101 Avondale, AZ 85392 Office: (623) 469-6603 The post Bankruptcy Substitutes and How You Can Settle Your Debts appeared first on My AZ Lawyers.

The typical scenario in which this arises is that you will be notified by the police that there is a warrant out for your arrest.  In this situation, your next move is crucial – sit and wait, and the warrant will remain active, and in the event you are stopped in a vehicle for any […] The post What Should You Do if You Have a Warrant Out for Your Arrest in Pennsylvania? appeared first on .

     The 11th Circuit has chimed in on the fairly unusual procedure of granting retroactive relief from the automatic stay to permit otherwise prohibited conduct in Baker v. Bank of America, N.A., 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 40615, Case No. 20-10780 (29 December 2020).  There had been five transfers of ownership in the property, all by quit claim deed, between 2006 and 2017, with Baker, the debtor in the 5th case, retaining an ownership interest after the first two transfers, and receiving complete ownership after the 5th transfer.  The property was subject to four prior bankruptcies just prior to the foreclosure sale on the home, all dismissed for failure to attend the meeting of creditors or file schedules, and this involved the fifth case, filed the day before the foreclosure sale.  Rather than cancelling the sale, as it had done for the four prior cases, Bank of America (BANA) proceeded with and completed the foreclosure sale.  Baker then sued BANA and the winning bidder at the sale for violating the automatic stay.  BANA requested, and obtained retroactive relief from the automatic stay, which decision was affirmed by the district court.   Baker initially challenged BANA's standing to appeal as is was not a secured creditor in the case.  To establish subject matter jurisdiction, a party must show it has a case or controversy.  This is shown by proving that the ligation has 1) an injury in fact 2) that if fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant and 3) is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.1  BANA's injury is shown by both the loan default and the request for sanctions against it, both directly traceable to Baker, and the order retroactively lifting the stay is likely to redress such injuries.  The 11th Circuit also found that BANA had party in interest standing.  11 U.S.C. §362(d) permits 'a party of interest' to seek relief from the automatic stay.  Such section specifically permits relief against real estate by a creditor whose claim is secured by such real estate if the court finds that the filing of the petition was part of a scheme to delay, hinder, or defraud creditors, involving either 1) the transfer of ownership in the property without such creditor's consent, or 2) multiple bankruptcy filings affecting the property.  A loan servicer is a party in interest in chapter 13 proceedings involving serviced loans.2  The Court found that the notices sent to Baker identifying BANA as the servicer of the mortgage established party in interest standing.  Next Baker argued that BANA improperly sought to reopen her case under 11 U.S.C. §350(b) after it had been dismissed with prejudice for again failing to cure deficiencies in her filing.  Specifically, she alleged that reopening under §350(b) is permitted only after a case has been closed under §350(a), and her case had been dismissed but not closed.  The 11th Circuit disagreed, finding that the court had dismissed the case, discharged the trustee, and ordered the case to be closed; which satisfied the plain terms of §350(a).  Baker then asserts that the bankruptcy court erred by not conducting an evidentiary hearing before granting BANA's request to reopen the case since her declaration in opposition to such request raised disputed issues of material fact regarding 1) her knowledge of the deed transfers and bankruptcy filings; 2) BANA's knowledge of the automatic stay and time of such knowledge; 3) her allegation that BANA's counsel advised her that the sale would be rescinded upon verification of the 5th bankruptcy filing, 4) BANA's delay in seeking relief from the stay, and 5) her allegation that she ceased to prosecute the 5th bankruptcy due to BANA's offer of a loan modification.  The 11th Circuit rejected this argument as Baker did not seek an evidentiary hearing until after the court granted the motion to reopen.  After the motion to reopen, the court scheduled a non-evidentiary hearing, which per local rules shall be restricted to the pleadings, affidavits and papers of record, and the argument of counsel; and which requires any documents intended for consideration must be filed and served no later than 4:30 on the 2nd business day prior to the hearing. A party challenging the absence of an evidentiary hearing must seasonably request such hearing in the lower court.3  Finally, getting to the heart of the case, the court found that retroactive relief from the automatic stay was justified under §362(d)(4).  The relevant question for such a ruling is whether the filing of the bankruptcy was part of a schedule to delay, hinder or defraud creditors that involved either a transfer of ownership of the property without the consent of the secured creditor or court approval, or multiple bankruptcy filings affecting such property.  The factual findings by the bankruptcy court supported such a finding, including determining that the case appears to be an extremely egregious situation given the multiple bankruptcy filings by multiple debtors, none of which appeared to be filed in good faith, and all of which were dismissed upon the debtors' collective failure to comply with the Bankruptcy Code and Rules.  Further, in imposing the 2 year stay relief provision in the dismissal order the court found a ten year failure to make payments on the loan, and that the delay caused by the multiple bankruptcy filings made such relief appropriate under §362(d)(4).  While §362(d)(1) requires a finding of cause to lift the stay, §362(d)(4) includes no such requirement.  Further such cause is found in the bankruptcy court's determinations. 1 Jacobson v. Fla. Sec'y of State, 974 F.3d 1236, 1245 (11th Cir. 2020). ↩2 Greer v. O'Dell, 305 F.3d 1297, 1302 (11th Cir. 2002).↩3 Sunseri v. Macro Cellular Partners, 412 F.3d 1247, 1250 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Aoude v. Mobil Oil Corp., 892 F.2d 1115, 1120 (1st Cir. 1989)).↩Michael BarnettMichael Barnett, PA506 N Armenia Ave.Tampa, FL 33609-1703813 870-3100https://hillsboroughbankruptcy.com

   The Southern District of Florida case affirmed Judge Cristal in Miami finding that the debtor could not claim a homestead exemption in property bequeathed to  them during the chapter 13 case, when they subsequently converted to chapter 7.  Rodriguez v. Mukamal, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 181932, Case no 20-20583-Civ-Scola (1 October 2020).  The debtors had filed a chapter 13 case in 2013 listing their residence as homestead (unit 204) though not claiming the homestead exemption on schedule C.   Four months after filing the wife's mother passed away, leaving the debtors another unit in the same building (unit 106).  Debtors did not disclose this interest in the new unit until after converting their chapter 13 to a chapter 7 on 30 April 2019.  In the meantime, they continued to live in unit 204 until mid to late 2015 when it was sold at foreclosure, and they moved into unit 106.  Debtors amended schedule A/B after conversion and claimed unit 106 as exempt.  The trustee objected to the exemption, which objection was sustained by Judge Cristol in the bankruptcy court.  Judge Scola on appeal first noted that the new unit became property of the estate under 11 U.S.C. §541(a)(5)(A), under which property becomes property of the estate if a debtor acquires or becomes entitled to acquire an interest in property by bequest, devise, or inheritance.  As the Debtor-wife became entitled to acquire the unit upon her mother's death, within 128 days of the filing of the case, it is clearly property of the estate.  Pursuant to §348(f) the unit remained property of the estate upon conversion of the case to chapter 7.   The problem for the Debtors is that the availability of exemptions is determined as of the commencement of the case.1  As at the time of filing the Debtors had no interest in unit 106, it could not have qualified as homestead as of the date of filing, and their reference as of filing to unit 204 as their homestead precludes any finding that unit 106 could have qualified as homestead status at that time.  Debtors' argument on the equities was non-availing, in no small part due to their failure to disclose the inheritance of unit 106 as is required within 14 days of discovery of such interest under Rule 1007(h) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.  Instead they 1) proposed and obtained confirmation of a plan which failed to disclose such interest, 2) filed a false schedule as late as February 2019 failing to disclose the interest, 3) submitted income statements for 2015 which did not disclose that their mortgage payments of $1,600/month had been eliminated mid-year due to the foreclosure of the unit, and 4) did not submit income statements after 2015 which would have disclosed the elimination of the $1600/month mortgage payment which had been used to compute the chapter 13 plan payments.  Debtors and counsel must be aware of the intricacies of bankruptcy law and state exemptions.  In hindsight it likely would have been much better to 1) disclose the interest as required under the statute; and/or 2) refile a chapter 7 case with a new date to determine exemptions.1 See Carpenter v. Brown, 13-CV-61183, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112607, 2013 WL 4047017, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 9, 2013) (Moore, J.) ("Exemptions are determined as of the date of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy court.") (citing 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(A) which provides that an individual debtor may exempt from his bankruptcy estate "any property that is exempt under Federal law . . . or State or local law that is applicable on the date of the filing of the petition.").↩Michael BarnettMichael Barnett, PA506 N Armenia Ave.Tampa, FL 33609-1703813 870-3100https://hillsboroughbankruptcy.com     

There are a number of reasons why a driver’s license may be suspended.  For example, maybe the driver was convicted of Driving Under the Influence charge; or, maybe a driver has too many points on his or her driver’s license; or maybe a driver has unpaid traffic tickets.  Whatever the reason may be, this Blog […] The post How to Restore Your Driver’s License in Pennsylvania appeared first on .

   The appeal in Wizenberg v Wizenberg, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 39276, Case No 20-10641 (11th Cir. 15 December 2020) came from a §523(a)(4) action in the debtor-attorney's chapter 7 arising from allegations that the debtor had failed to distribute estate funds in accordance with his mother's trust upon her death, and that he appropriate funds from the estate for his personal use.  The sanctions arose from multiple instances of misconduct both in the proceedings below and on appeal, including repeated 'shushing' of opposing counsel during s deposition, submission of lengthy and superfluous filings (including one with a nonsensical haiku), and an argument found to be frivolous that the bankruptcy court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the §523(a)(4) complaint.     In the appeal at issue, the Peter, the Defendant/Appellant asserted that the bankruptcy court was required to conduct an evidentiary hearing before sanctioning him, and challenged the time entries supporting the sanctions.  The Appellee, Howard argued that this argument was waived by not being raised in the bankruptcy court.  The bankruptcy court litigation commenced with a complaint under either §523(a)(4) or (a)(6).  The court denied Peter's initial motion to dismiss, as well as cross motions for summary judgment.  Peter then filed a 69 page motion to dismiss asserting lack of subject matter jurisdiction, asserting the complaint sought nondischargeability of a nonexistent debt, that such debt never existed or even possibly could have existed.  Howard responded and moved for sanctions under 28 U.S.C. §1927, which permits sanctions for any attorney who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously in the amount of the excess costs, expenses, and attorney fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.    Peter then filed a 153 page motion for reconsideration of the bankruptcy court's order denying his motion for summary judgment including immaterial details about his family life, as well as the haiku which read "All know: talk is cheap; Liars can claim anything; No evidence?! Balk!" which the court described as pointless poetry.  During the deposition the next day Peter engaged in multiple hostile exchanges with Howard and opposing counsel, asked repetitive and unprofessional questions, told opposing counsel to Shush re, and bickered with opposing counsel on the record.  After the deposition Howard moved the court to compel Peter to produce a privilege log, indicating that Peter had testified to the existence of relevant and responsive documents that he did not produce based on the attorney-client privilege.  Howard asserted that such log was not produced and that Peter claimed not to know what one was.  During a subsequent deposition of Peter's wife, after five minutes of questioning by Howard, Peter asked irrelevant and leading questions of his wife on 're-direct' for approximately an hour.   The initial sanctions from the bankruptcy court arose from an order to show cause regarding Peter's failure to produce the privilege logs, at which the court complained that a lawyer who had practiced several years but claimed not to know what a privilege log was, awarded Howard $2,880 in fees.  The matter went to trial in the bankruptcy court, ahead of which Peter filed a 326-page opening statement (including exhibits) and failed to produce an exhibit register.  The court admonished Peter for objection to Howard's answers to his own questions, for asking Howard if he had any evidence to support his statements, and ignoring the court's rulings on this objections as well as coaching his own witnesses.  Howard renewed and supplemented his request for sanctions asserting he incurred thousands of dollars in needless fees due to Peter's bad faith litigation tactics, requesting $24,880 in fees under 28 U.S.C. §1927.  The Court then ruled in favor of Howard on the dischargeability issue under §523(a)(4) and (a)(6), finding that Peter had allowed his wife to remove items from his mother's house while she was still alive, and that he engaged in a scheme to allow designed to ensure that Howard got as little as possible from her estate.  While Peter responded to the motion for sanctions (alleging it was false, malicious, frivolous, and vexatious) he did not challenge any of the time entries in Howard's motion or request an evidentiary hearing.    Finding that Peter acted in bad faith throughout the course of litigation, and had 'suffocated' the docket with painfully long and frivolous pleadings, many of which were not based in law or fact, and citing his withholding of evidence and rude and repetitive questions during the depositions, and noting because of his litigiousness the adversary proceeding took 14 months and over 250 docket entries, allowed sanctions of $9,850 under §1927.    On appeal in the district court, while finding the bankruptcy court was not a court of the United States within the reach of 28 U.S.C. 1927, concluded that as it was treating the order as a report and recommendation, it could impose the sanctions itself under §1927, noting that may of Peter's arguments were first raised on appeal.  The 11th Circuit first addressed the ability of bankruptcy court's to impose sanctions under §1927.  While noting the argument was likely waived by not being addressed in the bankruptcy court, the 11th Circuit rejected the argument noting that all cases originate in the Article III district court per 28 U.S.C. §1334, and are referred to the bankruptcy court by local rule.     The 11th Circuit next addressed whether the district court abused its discretion in imposing sanctions under §1927.  The requirements for such sanctions areFirst, the attorney must engage in unreasonable and vexatious conduct. Second, that unreasonable and vexatious conduct must be conduct that multiplies the proceedings. Finally, the dollar amount of the sanction must bear a financial nexus to the excess proceedings, i.e., the sanction may not exceed the costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.  Amlong & Amlong, P.A. v. Denny's, Inc., 500 F.3d 1230, 1239 (11th Cir. 2007).  The question of bad faith turns turns on the attorney objective conduct rather than counsel's subjective intent.  The 11th Circuit found that the facts detailed in the proceedings below warranted sanctions under §1927 by dragging out the proceedings and causing Howard to incur excess costs, noting the rude and unprofessional conduct in the depositions and a trial, and his voluminous and irrelevant motions.  The court further noted that is conduct was not excused by his pro-se status, as he is a member of the Florida Bar who had previously appeared in bankruptcy court. The 11th Circuit also found the motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction to be frivolous.  Next the 11th Circuit determined that the bankruptcy court had not deprived Peter of due process, as the motion for sanctions included several specific examples of sanctionable behavior.  Nor was the bankruptcy court required to hold an evidentiary hearing, as Peter had abandoned that claim by failing to adequately brief the issue in his opening brief.  Finally, the 11th Circuit granted Howard's motion for attorneys fees under Fed. R. App. P 38 allowing damages and single or double costs to the appellee if the court determines that an appeal is frivolous.  The court found it has authority to award such sanctions when a party ignored the governing law and relied on clearly frivolous arguments.1  The court granted the request for Rule 38 sanctions noting that Peter, a self-proclaimed bankruptcy attorney, filed an 88 page opening brief littered with exclamation points and rants about what he views as a grave miscarriage of justice, failed to coherently cite case law, though citing Buggs Bunny.  The court awarded $3,390 in sanctions under Rule 38 and affirmed the district court sanctions. The 11th Circuit did not definitively rule on the power of bankruptcy court's to impose sanctions under 28 U.S.C. §1927.1  Jackson v. Bank of America, N.A., 898 F.3d 1348, 1359 (11th Cir. 2018).↩Michael BarnettMichael Barnett, PA506 N Armenia Ave.Tampa, FL 33609-1703813 870-3100https://hillsboroughbankruptcy.com

The Hardest Question You’ll Get Asked at Your Bankruptcy Hearing Like most people, you will be stressed when you get ready for your bankruptcy hearing. People are worried they’ll be asked “How did you get into this mess?” Actually, that almost never comes  up. The hardest question that always comes up is this one: “Have […] The post “Have You Sent Us a Bank Statement for Every Account?” by Robert Weed appeared first on Northern VA Bankruptcy Lawyer Robert Weed.

    Judge Moberly in Indiana was faced with a trustee's attempt to revoke his prior abandonment of a class action claim related to the drug Abilify.  In re Fuller, 2020 Bankr. LEXIS 3503, Case No 18-00681-RLM-7A (Bankr. S.D. Ind., 14 December 2020).  The debtor filed chapter 7 on 9 February 2018, disclosing 'debtor has a pending class action lawsuit against Abilify' as well as a potential class action against another entity.  The asset was scheduled at $0 on schedule A/B.  He also disclosed that he had sold his interest in certain oil wells prepetition for $315,000 and that he gambled away most of these proceeds.   The trustee held a 341 meeting on March 9, 2018 and followed up with a 2004 examination and moved for employment of an accountant to perform a forensic audit on all of Debtor's financial information.  Subsequently the trustee filed a 'report of possible assets' indicating the only asset he sought to administer was the debtor's nonexempt interest in the oil wells.   A report of possible assets and abandonment of property was filed on 26 September 2018 which indicated all property other than the interest in the oil wells would be abandoned, and gave a deadline of 10 October 2018 to object to such abandonment.  No objections were filed.  The debtor continued the class action Abilify suit and a settlement was reached in March 2020 providing a share of over $229,000 to the Debtor.  The trustee then moved to reopen the case and to administer this asset, incorrectly designated in the motion as an 'undisclosed asset.'  The case was reopened, and the trustee moved to set aside the prior Rule 6007 abandonment notice.  Without objection, the court granted the trustee's motion on 9 April 2020, and the trustee issued a new notice of possible assets.  At this point the Debtor moved to set aside the Court's order setting aside the abandonment notice.  The court reviewed the audio file of the 341 confirming that the class action was disclosed and discussed.   The Debtor's motion to set aside the initial order which itself set aside the abandonment of the class action was filed under Rule 9024, which is equivalent to a Rule 60(b) motion under the Fed. R. Civ. P.  The Debtor has the burden under such motions to show good cause for his failure to timely object to the trustee's motion, 2) that the debtor quickly filed his 9024 motion, and 3) that he has a meritorious defense.  Given that the trustee's motion to set aside the abandonment included errors both referring to a product liability claim and an undisclosed asset, it was not clear from such motion that it referred to the abandonment of a disclosed asset.  The court found that this met the burden for relief under Rule 9024.  Abandonment of estate assets is governed by  11 U.S.C. 554.  The first two subparts: §554(a) and (b) involve a trustee's or a party in interest's request to abandon specific property.  Subsections (c) and (d) involve property that has not been abandoned from the estate and has not been administered by the estate, which, if properly scheduled, is automatically abandoned upon the closing of the case under  §554(c).  If property has not been scheduled, it remains property of the estate under §554(d), subject to the court's ability to order otherwise under §554(c) and (d), but not under §554(a) and (b).     While the trustee asserted that his motion fell under §554(c), the court disagreed.  The notice provided by the court with the initial abandonment complied with Fed. R. Bankr. P. 6007, which conforms with the abandonment procedure under §554(a), specifically requiring notice of the proposed abandonment, notice to all creditors, and allowing a party in interest to file and serve an objection within 14 days of the mailing of the notice.  The notice clearly indicated that the trustee intended to abandon all property that was not scheduled other than the Debtor's interest in oil wells.  Abandonment constitutes a divesture of all of the estate's interest in the property.  The property then reverts to the debtor as though no bankruptcy was filed.1 Abandonment under §554(a) or (b) is considered strictly irrevocable, whereas abandonment under §554(c) is subject to the rebuttable presumption standard, since a technical abandonment may occur inadvertently as a automatic consequence of a premature case closing.  Courts have found a narrow exception to this strictly irrevocable rule if the trustee is given incomplete or false information, causing the trustee to forego a proper investigation of the asset.2  Courts have found that an asset is adequately scheduled if it is described with reasonable particularization under the circumstances, sufficient to enable the trustee to determine wehther to investigate further.  A description is not misleading if the scheduled asset appreciates and it is discovered to be worth more than the scheduled value.  Here the trustee argued that the debtor failed to disclose important material facts surrounding the Abilify claim, such as the fact that he had retained attorneys to represent him as principal lead in the class action.  While it was disclosed at the 341 meeting that the lawsuit primarily dealt with Abilify's side effects that exacerbated compulsive behavior, the trustee asserts that the retention of the attorney included several other legal theories including bodily injury, pain and suffering, loss of earnings, and aggravation of previously existing conditions.  Further, Debtor had not disclosed counsel's retention on Scedule G.  The Court rejected these arguments, noting that the debtor is not required to disclose every aspect of the Abilify claim, solely sufficient information to put the trustee on notice to further investigate the claim.  The discussion at the 341 meeting shows the disclosure was sufficient to this purpose.  Debtor's counsel explained that the claim was valued at $0 as they did not have a number yet due to the fact that the claim was part of a class action.  The trustee had asked for the names of doctors that had treated the debtor, and had asked one of his employees who had participated in the 341 meeting to search the internet for side effects of Abilify.  He also asked for release of medical records as well as the name of the firm handling the class action.   Two important policies support the Court's determination that the abandonment cannot be revoked.  There is a strong policy of finality that should be respected in bankruptcy cases, as it was Congress' intent that debtors and creditors be subject to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court for a limited time; and that distribution to creditors is the core of bankruptcy policy.  As Debtor's discharge had been revoked, he will continue to owe his creditors whether the settlement proceeds are administered by the trustee or outside the estate without trustee administrative fees.  The case was not clear why the discharge had been revoked. Query how much impact did the revocation of discharge have in this case?  The strictly irrevocable standard would seem to be met, though the case is a warning to trustee's that some investigation may preclude subsection revocation of abandonment. Michael BarnettMichael Barnett, PA506 N Armenia Ave.Tampa, FL 33609-1703813 870-3100https://hillsboroughbankruptcy.com 1 In re Dewsnup 908 F.2d 588, 590 (10th Cir. 1990), aff'd sub nom. Dewsnup v. Timm 502 U.S. 410, 112 S.Ct. 773, 116 L.Ed.2d 903 (1992).↩2 Catalano v. Commissioner, 279 F.3d 682, 686 (9th Cir.2002); In re Lusher, Case No. 18-71772, 2019 Bankr. LEXIS 2916, 2019 WL 4553432 at * 3 (Bankr. C. D. Ill. September 19, 2019). ↩ 

 In a very convoluted case, a plaintiff learned that removal to Bankruptcy Court can result in a do-over of adverse state court rulings.  Cohen v. Gilmore (Matter of Alabama & Dunlavy), Case No. 19-20152 (5th Cir. 12/15/20).  While the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits a federal court from re-examining findings in an unrelated state court case, it does not grant similar protections in a removed action for the reason that the removed action is a continuation of the original case, just with a different presiding court.What Happened (In Brief) The facts of the case are very complicated. Here is an overly simplified summary. Alabama & Dunlavy owned some real property in Houston.  A trust controlled by Cohen was the 80% limited partner of Alabama & Dunlavy (A & D). In 2008, the Great Recession hit and the debt matured. Dilick controlled the general partner of A & D and also controlled the remaining limited partnership interest. Abercrombie was a developer. Abercrombie and Dilick approached the trustee of Cohen's trust about selling the property for $16.7 million. The trustee said yes because the partnership would make a profit. However, Abercrombie and Dilick failed to disclose that HEB was interested in signing a ground lease which would greatly increase the value of the property.Abercrombie signed the ground lease with HEB under an entity named TAFI that had yet to be formed. Dilick then caused A & D to sell the property to TAFI for $13.5 million.  Shortly after acquiring the property     TAFI took out a loan for $19.9 million against the property. Various people got money, including  HEB's director of real estate. Cohen sued Abercrombie and TAFI among others. The state court granted Abercrombie and TAFI's motion for summary judgment after it excluded most of Cohen's summary judgment evidence.  The summary judgment apparently was never severed out of the case and remained interlocutory.   Several years later in 2015, A & D filed Chapter 7 bankruptcy and Regions Bank, which was another defendant, removed the case to Bankruptcy Court. The case was referred to the U.S. District Court. The District Court entered an agreed final judgment on February 7, 2019 among the remaining parties.  Abercrombie and TAFI never participated in the District Court litigation. Abercrombie and his lawyer both died. The property was sold to a third party. The Issue Arrives at the Fifth Circuit Cohen then appealed to the Fifth Circuit. So, what was the Fifth Circuit doing reviewing a summary judgment granted by a state court? Although the District Court never addressed the Abercrombie and TAFI claims, they were still part of the case. In this circuit, when a case is removed from state court to federal court, the federal court takes the case as it finds it and treats the state court rulings as its own. . . . Since the Fifth Circuit has eschewed legal formalities and treated cases like this one as reviewable even if the district court provided little discussion of the state court decision, this case is ready for appellate review.Opinion, p. 7. What A Difference A Court MakesWhere the change in forum really made a difference was in the Fifth Circuit's review of the State District Court's ruling on the motion for summary judgment. In Texas State Court, rulings on summary judgment evidence can be very informal. In this case, the State Court signed an order which granted or denied various evidentiary objections without explanation. This is not adequate in federal court. Cohen contends that the state trial court abused its discretion in granting several evidentiary objections in TAFI’s and Abercrombie’s favor. We agree. The grant of these objections improperly excluded important evidence from consideration. To start, the state trial court offered no explanation as to why it granted the objections. It simply checked boxes on a form saying that the objections were sustained. Since a trial court can abuse its discretion by failing to explain the reasons for excluding evidence, the lack of a reasoned explanation weighs in favor of overturning the objections.  Courts also typically consider evidence unless the objecting party can show that it could not be reduced to an admissible form at trial. Opinion, pp. 8-9.  This passage illustrates a remarkable difference between the state and federal courts. In my experience, state courts rarely explain their rulings. In the unusual cases where a motion for summary judgment is taken under advisement, the typical ruling from the court is a one sentence letter stating that the motion is granted or denied. Evidentiary objections are disposed of with a simple granted or denied.Because the Court considered it an abuse of discretion to exclude evidence without stating a reason, it considered the summary judgment evidence. Because the Court examined the summary judgment evidence, it found that there were fact issues. Because the Court found that there were fact issues, it reversed the summary judgment.  As a result, seven years and one month after the summary judgment was granted, and after both the defendant and his lawyer had passed away, the summary judgment was reversed.Practice TipsThe obvious practice tip for a party receiving an unexplained and possibly unconsidered ruling from a state court is to get the case to federal court before the judgment is final. This won't always be possible. If the claims on which summary judgment were granted were the only claims in the case, the judgment would have been final prior to bankruptcy. Similarly, filing bankruptcy after a state court has ruled but before it has entered its order is unlikely to provide any relief. However, in a complicated suit with lots of parties and claims, a terrible, horrible ruling might face a stricter review in federal court as opposed to being rubber stamped in state court.The practice point for the party better the terrible, horrible ruling (or the wonderful, well-thought out decision depending on where you sit) is to get the ruling severed into its own case so it can become final. While I don't know what happened (any counsel is no longer around to explain), what probably occurred was that the defendants got their take-nothing ruling and assumed the case was over. Unfortunately, it was not.   On a final note, this case just smelled bad and that may have affected the ruling.    

Chapter 7 Trustee Janet Meiberger Janet Meiberger is one of the four Chapter 7 trustees in the Alexandria Virginia Bankruptcy court. When you file a bankruptcy case in Alexandria, the computer assigns you to one of the four trustees. Lawyers are appointed Chapter 7 trustees as a part-time assignment.  Janet Meiberger has her own law […] The post Chapter 7 Trustee Janet Meiberger by Robert Weed appeared first on Northern VA Bankruptcy Lawyer Robert Weed.