From: CNBC.comBy: Megan Leonhardthttps://www.cnbc.com/2019/09/18/student-loans-are-not-the-no-1-source-of-millennial-debt.html
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Your Social Security Statement is a secure, official record of your earnings and estimated disability benefits. These statements are important to check and review, because they will help to give you a more accurate idea of the benefits you might qualify for in the future. In this article, our Pennsylvania disability lawyers explain everything you […] The post How Do I Get My Social Security Statement in NJ or Pennsylvania? appeared first on .
A living trust is a legal document that states who you want to manage and distribute your assets if you're unable to do so, and who receives them when you pass away. Having one helps communicate your wishes so your loved ones aren't left guessing or dealing with the courts.This is what Legal Zoom says about Living Trusts. What it does not say is that unless a living trust is set up properly, it can result in loss of the Texas homestead exemption as the Debtor found out in Case No. 18-50102, In re Steven Jeffrey Cyr (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 7/16/19) which can be found here.What Happened Dr. Steven J. Cyr is a doctor who retired from the Air Force with the rank of Lt. Colonel. In 2007, he and his wife purchased a home in San Antonio with a mortgage of $2.1 million. He also purchased a second property in 2017. On September 12, 2014, Dr. Cyr and his wife created a living trust and transferred their home into it by warranty deed. Dr. and Mrs. Cyr were the Trustmakers, trustees and beneficiaries of the living trust. However, Dr. Cyr resigned as a Trustee as of January 1, 2018.On January 20, 2018, Dr. Cyr filed a petition under Chapter 7. Several parties objected to his homestead exemption. Additionally, there were adversary proceedings filed to avoid transfers, determine the dischargeability of a specific debt and dney discharge.Judge Craig Gargotta conducted a four day trial concluding on March 7, 2019.The RulingJudge Gargotta rejected the argument that the Cyrs had abandoned their homestead. Although Mrs. Cyr and their children moved out of the residence post-petition, Dr. Cyr never did. Even though a real estate agent created a brochure and video for sale of the property, the property was never actually marketed.However, the Court found that the property lost its homestead status when it was transferred to the living trust without complying with Texas Property Code Sec. 41.0021.Prior to 2009, there was a controversy over whether property transferred to a living trust could be claimed as homestead. In 2009, the Texas legislature sought to fix this problem by enacting Sec. 41.0021 which states that property transferred to a "qualifying trust" which is occupied by the owner as his residence would constitute the owner's homestead. A "qualifying trust" was defined as an express trust (1) in which the instrument or court order creating the trust provides that a settlor or beneficiary of the trust has the right to:(A) revoke the trust without the consent of another person;(B) exercise an inter vivos general power of appointment over the property that qualifies for the homestead exemption; or(C) use and occupy the residential property as the settlor’s or beneficiary’s principal residence at no cost to the settlor or beneficiary, other than payment of taxes and other costs and expenses specified in the instrument or court order:(i) for the life of the settlor or beneficiary;(ii) for the shorter of the life of the settlor or beneficiary or a term of years specified in the instrument or court order; or(iii) until the date the trust is revoked or terminated by an instrument or court order recorded in the real property records of the county in which the property is located and that describes the property with sufficient certainty to identify the property; and(2) the trustee of which acquires the property in an instrument of title or under a court order that:(A) describes the property with sufficient certainty to identify the property and the interest acquired; and(B) is recorded in the real property records of the county in which the property is located.Subsection (a)(1) is written in the disjunctive so that only one of its three options need be satisfied. However, Judge Gargotta found that none of the provisions applied.First, Judge Gargotta found that the settlor did not have the right to revoke the trust without the consent of another person. Under the trust document, both of the settlors had to consent to revocation of the trust. Rather than interpreting the clause to mean that someone other than the settlors had to consent, Judge Gargotta found that the requirement for both parties to consent did not satisfy subsection (a)(1)(A). The Trust also failed to include a provision allowing for an inter vivos general power of appointment over the property.Finally, the trust document allowed the owners to occupy the property "rent free and without charge" but did not say that they could occupy the property at no cost as required by the statute. The problem is that Texas law has two definitions of a "qualifying trust." A qualifying trust under the Texas Tax Code is one in which the party may occupy the property rent free and without charge. Tex. Tax Code Sec. 11.13(j). However, the Property Code requires that the person be allowed to use the property without charge. Tex. Prop. Code Sec. 41.002(a)(1)(C). Judge Gargotta concluded that the Texas legislature must have meant something different by the two formulations and that therefore, the Tax Code language would not satisfy the requirements of the Property Code.Thus, for lack of proper verbiage, the homestead exemption was lost.Why The Opinion May Be Wrong or At Least Should Be Wrong There are some reasons to believe that Judge Gargotta's ruling may be in error. Homesteads are favorites of the law. There was good law that transfers of property to a living trust did not forfeit homestead protection prior to the 2009 law. Additionally, Judge Gargotta's hyper-technical application of the statute seems contrary to the intent of the statute. (In giving my opinion, I am cognizant of the fact that Judge Gargotta has "Judge" before his name. As a result, his opinions carry legal force and mine are merely an appeal to the court of public opinion). Under Texas law, where one person holds both legal and equitable title to a property, the estates are merged and the person holds the property free of trust. In re Vazquez, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 642 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2012), aff'd. Lowe v. Vazquez, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44271 (W.D. Tex. 2013). Unfortunately, here there were two trustees and two beneficiaries. However, it is not an outlandish argument to say that the community estate of the Cyrs held both legal and equitable title, therefore extinguishing the trust.Prior to the Cyr decision, there was not any precedent interpreting Sec. 41.0021. Therefore, Judge Gargotta was free to interpret the text in a manner which harmonized both its text and purpose. The purpose was obviously to avoid loss of homestead protection when property was conveyed to a living trust. I will acknowledge that the literal language of Sec.41.0021(a)(1)(A) says that a qualifying trust is one in which "a settlor or beneficiary" has the right to "revoke the trust without the consent of another person." This language seems to say that one person must be able to unilaterally terminate the trust. However, given the importance of the homestead exemption, I would read the phrase to say that no one other than another settlor or beneficiary is needed to terminate the trust.Finally, I think that the phrases "rent free and without charge" and "at no cost" say the same thing. I don't think that whether someone gets to keep their homestead should depend on the slavish application of magic words.Finally, what is the consequence of the homestead being found non-exempt? If both debtors had filed, the trustee could have exercised their power to revoke the trust. However, that could not be done because Mrs. Cyr did not file bankruptcy. So the property is owned by a trust rather than the estate. Under Texas law, creditors can reach the interest of a debtor in a self-settled trust. This means that the property contributed by the debtor is subject to claims of creditors. Shurley v. Texas Commerce Bank-Austin, N.A. (In re Shirley). 115 F.3d 333 (5th Cir. 1997). The debtor contributed an undivided one-half interest in the property to the trust. Thus, the trustee can only reach that undivided interest. Avoiding the ProblemThere is any easy solution to this problem. Never, ever, ever, ever transfer your homestead to a living trust. The advantage of a living trust is that it supposedly avoids the need to probate a will. However, probate in Texas is easy. If your client has already executed a living trust, revoke it prior to filing. The essence of a living trust is that it is freely revocable. Debtor's lawyers should always ask their client if they have conveyed their homestead to a living trust. It may be necessary to ask the question in several different ways. However, it is too important a step not to take. Post-Script:After the decision came down, the debtor filed a notice of appeal. The parties then filed a joint motion to have the case mediated before another federal Bankruptcy Judge. As a result, Mr. Cyr still has a chance to retain his home.
The Third Circuit held that a foreclosure sale of a property tax lien certificate was held to be an avoidable preference in Hackler v. Arianna Holdings Co., LLC, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 27514, Case #18-1650 (3rd Cir. 12 September 2019). In 2013 the township of North Brunswich, NJ held a duly advertised tax sale for unpaid property taxes on a parcel of land owned by the Hacklers. Under the procedures of such sale, the purchasers bid on the interest rate to be paid on the tax certificate, and Phoenix Funding, Inc. bid the interest rate down to 0%, and paid a premium of $13,500 above the value of the lien to purchase the tax certificate. Phoenix then paid the delinquent taxes when they come due and charged the state allowed 18% interest on the subsequent taxes. Under NJ procedures, if the property owner does not pay the certificate holder the redemption amount, the original taxes and subsequent taxes at 18% interest, the certificate holder may file for a foreclosure judgment after 2 years. Such judgment vests title directly in the lien certificate holder. Phoenix filed such a foreclosure after waiting the required 2 years, and on May 9, 2016 assigned the certificate to Ariana Holding Company, LLC. When the certificate was not redeemed, property vested in Ariana on 6 October 2016. On 14 December 2016 the Hacklers filed for relief under chapter 13. The schedules showed the value of the property at $335,000, far exceeding the $42,561.21 amount on a proof of claim filed by Ariana, as well as other liens totaling $89,000. The plan provided for payment of Ariana in full. Debtors also filed an adversary to avoid the foreclosure sale under §547(d) of the code and both parties moved for summary judgment. the bankruptcy court ruled in favor of the Hacklers, which was affirmed by the district court, and Ariana appealed to the 3rd Circuit. The circuit court first examined the statute itself. §547(b) of the Bankruptcy Code permits the trustee to avoid any transfer:(1) to or for the benefit of a creditor;(2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before such transfer was made; (3) made while the debtor was insolvent; (4) made -- (A) on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition; or (B) between ninety days and one year before the date of the filing of the petition, if such creditor at the time of such transfer was an insider; and (5) that enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor would receive if-- (A) the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title; (B) the transfer had not been made; and (C) such creditor received payment of such debt to the extent provided by the provisions of this title. 11 U.S.C. 547(b). The transfer meets the stated requirements to fall under §547(b), and does not lead to an absurd result, therefore should apply to the foreclosure sale of the tax certificate. Ariana raises two arguments. First, it argues that a lawfully-conducted state tax foreclosure sale cannot constitute a voidable preference under §547 relying on the Supreme Court's decision in BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp.1 Second, Ariana argues avoidance of the transfer wold violate the tax injunction act, 28 U.S.C. §1341. As to the first argument, the 3rd Circuit distinguished BFP. BFP held that a non-collusive real estate mortgage foreclosure sale conducted in conformance with applicable state law satisfied the requirement of §548 that a property transfer be made in exchange for a reasonably equivalent value, thereby protecting it from voidance. BFP was interpreting the fraudulent avoidance statute, §548, rather than the preference statute. Second, the case was grounded on interpretation of 'reasonably equivalent value' which appears no where else in the code. The BFP court interpreted reasonably equivalent value as distinct from fair market value as recognizing that property sold at a forced sale, such as a foreclosure sale, cannot be expected to bring the price it would command if sold in a fair market. The foreclosure process is distinguished from the tax certificate sale proceess, where the bids for sale of the certificate relate only to the interest rate to be paid on such certificate rather than on the value of the property. The court noted in a footnote that the reasoning of BFP may not apply to forced sales to satisfy tax liens.2 BFP's reliance on the language 'reasonably equivalent value' simply has no application to §547(b) which does not use this language. Nor does the conclusion conflict with NJ State law, as the NJ Fraudulent provision statute does not address preferential transfers. Nor did the 3rd Circuit accept Ariana's argument that the avoidance violates the tax injunction act of 28 U.S.C. §1341. This act provides that district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law if a remedy exists in state law. The circuit court held that the Tax Injunction Act does not prevent a Bankruptcy Court from enforcing the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code that affect the collection of state taxes.3 As all requirements for satisfying 11 U.S.C. 547(b) were met, the Court affirmed the District Court's decision resulting in avoidance of the tax certificate sale as a voidable preference.1 511 U.S. 531, 114 S.Ct. 1757, 128 L.Ed.2d 556 (1994)↩2 Id. n.3↩3 In re Hechinger Inv. Co. of Del., 335 F.3d 243, 247 n.1 (3rd Cir. 2003)↩Michael BarnettMichael Barnett, PA506 N Armenia Ave.Tampa, FL 33609-1703813 870-3100mbarnett@tampabankruptcy.comhttps://hillsboroughbankruptcy.com
The Social Security Administration (SSA) administers two programs which provide disability benefits for qualified applicants in New Jersey and Pennsylvania: Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI), which is based on earned “work credits,” and Supplemental Security Income (SSI), which is intended for low-income applicants who do not have a work history. While disability benefits provide essential […] The post How to Get Approved for Disability the First Time in Pennsylvania or NJ appeared first on .
By Stephanie Pagones | Published September 10, 2019 | Transportation | FOX BusinessManhattan federal prosecutors are probing possible lending fraud in the New York City taxi industry, according to a report.The Southern District of New York has been investigating possible crimes, such as bank, mail and wire fraud, over the past month in the wake of a string of suicides involving cabbies who were bogged down by heavy debt related to the ever-increasing cost of taxi medallions, The New York Times reported, citing sources with knowledge of the inquiry.A U.S. Attorney's Office representative declined to comment to the Times.The cost of a taxi medallion rose from $200,000 in 2002 to $1 million in 2014, the report states, while industry heads or medallion brokers used questionable lending tactics or provided their clients “insufficient or unclear information,” according to and Executive Summary released this summer by the City of New York pursuant to a 45-day review into the industry’s methods.As much as 95 percent of the city’s taxi drivers are immigrants, the summary states, many of whom speak English as a second language.“For current drivers, the largest single issue they face is an unaffordable level of debt. The average median debt owed by surveyed drivers is approximately $500,000,” according to the city record. “[Fifty-one percent] of surveyed drivers stated they struggle to pay their monthly bills and 26% stated they are considering bankruptcy.”In fact, over 900 livery cab drivers have declared bankruptcy, the Times reported.The Times interviewed an immigrant from Bangladesh who bought his taxi medallion in 2014 and signed a loan that required him to pay $1.7 million, even though his annual income was only about $30,000. He told the Times that he did not understand the terms of his loan, according to the report.New York Attorney General Letitia James announced in May she would be conducting her own review of the matter.https://www.foxbusiness.com/features/federal-prosecutors-probing-nyc-taxi-industry-wake-livery-driver-suicides
You are likely reading this article because you have a monthly car payment and other bills you are having trouble paying, and you are considering filing bankruptcy. You are struggling but want to keep your car, and have heard that filing a bankruptcy petition entitles you to modify your car loan and pay less for your car than you promised to pay when you purchased it. This is true, if certain conditions are met. When you file a Chapter 13 petition, “cram down” may be available. Cram down allows you to pay only what the car is worth, not what you owe on your loan (if greater), and allows you to pay it through your 3 or 5 year Chapter 13 plan, often at a more favorable interest rate. When you file a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition, cram down is not available, however, you may be able to pay less for your car and keep it using either Redemption or Reaffirmation. Redeeming a Car in Chapter 7 Bankruptcy The Bankruptcy Code provides that a Chapter 7 debtor can “redeem” his or her car by paying the creditor what the car is currently worth. The downside is that this must be paid in a lump sum. While this may seem on its face to be impractical, considering that in theory folks file for bankruptcy because they do not have enough money to pay their bills, actually, redemption is commonly used when the car’s current value is fairly low and the possibility of the debtor obtaining another car at that price is small. As far as valuation of the car for redemption purposes goes, your attorney can assist you with assessing the condition of your car and negotiating a mutually acceptable value with your creditor. Reaffirmation of an Auto Loan in Chapter 7 Bankruptcy If a Chapter 7 debtor is unable to come up with a lump-sum payment, or, if the debtor has “equity” in the vehicle (i.e., owes less than what the car is worth), the debtor might consider “reaffirming” the debt in order to keep the car. Reaffirmation requires the execution of a reaffirmation agreement between the debtor and the creditor which sets forth the terms of the loan going forward, and the debtor’s attorney must review the agreement and sign off on it otherwise it is subject to the scrutiny of the bankruptcy court. Often your attorney can obtain more favorable loan terms under the reaffirmation agreement than your original loan terms, by negotiating with the creditor over the length of the loan, the interest rate, and the amount of the monthly payment. Please take note of this important caveat: this article is not legal advice, nor is it intended to be legal advice. The purpose of this article is merely to illustrate the possible advantages of filing a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition and a Chapter 7 debtor’s options of redemption and reaffirmation. These are but two ways in which the Bankruptcy Code can be a powerful tool for an honest but unfortunate debtor, when utilized fully. An experienced bankruptcy attorney can guide you through the intricacies of redemption and reaffirmation and ensure that you pay only what you need to pay for your car and no more. Our office has successfully negotiated many car redemptions and reaffirmations. For a free consultation, contact us here or give us a call at 215-515-5046. The post How To Keep Your Car: Chapter 7 Redemption and Reaffirmation appeared first on Bankruptcy Lawyer in Philadelphia PA | David M. Offen Attorney at Law.
What to Expect at Your Bankruptcy Hearing For most people, your only bankruptcy hearing is what’s called the “meeting of creditors.” (We almost never actually have creditors show up. We can also call it your “trustee hearing.”) Here’s a video that explains where to go, best places to park, what to bring and what questions […] The post Announcement: What to Expect at Your Bankruptcy Hearing by Robert Weed appeared first on Robert Weed - AE.
Social Security survivor benefits are benefits provided to eligible widows and widowers by the Social Security Administration (SSA) after a spouse passes away. In order to qualify for survivor benefits, you must fall within certain age limits, in addition to meeting other criteria. For example, some surviving spouses can begin to receive benefits at age […] The post How Are Social Security Survivor Benefits Calculated in PA and NJ? appeared first on .