Social Security Disability Insurance, or SSDI, is a Federal Program that helps many Americans who cannot support themselves through work because they are disabled. However, the program can be extremely competitive, and many potential SSDI applicants may be hesitant to work toward getting benefits because they have heard that it is so hard to get an application approved. It is not at all uncommon for people to get denied on their first SSDI application. In fact, most people are denied on their initial application to the program. SSDI is a very competitive program, and evaluators have many applications to sift through. However, even if you are denied the first time around, you should not give up on getting disability benefits. Many applicants get their application approved when it is later reconsidered. For help with your SSDI needs, call Young, Marr, Mallis & Associates at (215) 515-2954 for Pennsylvania or (609) 557-3081 for New Jersey and talk to our SSDI Attorneys today. How Often Do People Get Denied in SSDI Applications? According to the most recent complete set of statistics, 67% of SSDI applications were denied on their application. Of the individuals awarded SSDI benefits, roughly 21% got their benefits from their initial application, while between 2% and 8% got benefits after having their application reconsidered. This demonstrates that it can be tough to get SSDI benefits. However, statistics do not tell the whole story. Many individuals are denied because there are mistakes on their application or because changes in their lives make it so they no longer need SSDI. Those applications are technically denials, but the former is easily fixed by our SSDI lawyers, and the latter removes the need to get benefits from the program. Major Reasons SSDI Applications are Denied When an SSDI application is denied, it is usually not for no reason at all. True, there are a handful of complete errors, as the evaluators are only human, but generally, there is something wrong with an application that needs to be fixed or explained. Absence of Medical Evidence A major reason that SSDI applications are denied is that there is not enough medical evidence in the application to prove that the applicant meets the disability threshold. If this is the reason your application was denied, you should work with our attorneys to have us gather the necessary medical records to have a successful application on appeal. Prior Denied Application If you submitted an application that was later denied, it can make it more difficult, but not impossible, to have a later application approved. This is different from having an application appealed or given a hearing, as that would involve a reexamination of an existing application, not an entirely new one. Income Thresholds If you have too much income, you can be ineligible for SSDI. There are thresholds for “substantial gainful activity which, once passed, prevent individuals from being eligible for SSDI. In 2024, the threshold for SDA is $1,550 earned a month for non-blind individuals and $2,590 earned a month for blind individuals. The amount for SDA is updated each year to account for inflation and other factors. Do SSDI Applications Take a Long Time to Finish? How long it takes to get your application through will depend on the facts and circumstances surrounding your case. The Social Security Disability website has a webpage detailing the things that can impact an SSDI application’s speed of going through the process. First, the nature of your disability can make an application go through slower or more quickly. Applicants with some disabilities, like blindness, may have their applications approved more quickly than applicants with other disabilities. Second, medical evidence requirements can slow down an application. Often, application evaluators will need medical records and other similar evidence to make a decision about your application. So, the quicker we can get that information into your account and to SSDI evaluators, the better. Third, evaluators may require that you undergo a medical examination before having your application approved, so an application can be delayed pending a medical checkup. Fourth, your application may need to be reviewed for “quality purposes.” This accounts for any potential hangups evaluators may have about your application. SSDI claims that it generally takes between six and eight months to fully review an initial SSDI application. Finally, when your application is approved, there is a subsequent waiting period of five months before Social Security starts paying you benefits. You get your first SSDI payments in the sixth full month after you are disabled, so you could wait longer than five months if your disability began in the middle of the month. Options After an SSDI Claim is Denied If your initial SSDI claim is denied, there are still options available to you to try and get the disability benefits you need. If your initial application is denied, you can file an appeal, request a hearing, and file a lawsuit in federal court. Appeal The first thing to do after your SSDI application is denied is to file an appeal. You can do this right up to 60 days after you get a notice that your application was denied. Administrative Hearing If your application is still denied after you request an appeal, you can have a hearing in front of an administrative judge. Much like in a court case, our lawyers will advocate for your SSDI eligibility at this kind of hearing. Federal Lawsuit If all else fails, you can sue in federal court. This lawsuit must be filed within 60 days of receiving notice that your appeal was denied. Call Our SSDI and Disability Lawyers Today to Discuss Your Claim If you have concerns about your situation, contact Young, Marr, Mallis & Associates’s SSDI Attorneys at (215) 515-2954 for Pennsylvania or (609) 557-3081 for New Jersey to discuss your claim for free.

M.D.N.C.: Atkinson v. Coats- Law Enforcement Officer involvement in Illegal Self-Help Repossession Ed Boltz Wed, 03/20/2024 - 01:39 Summary: When Carolina Repo  attempted a self-help repossession of her car,  Atkinson attempted to drive her vehicle away.  Carolina Repo then slid the tow bar under the car to disable it, demanded that she exit it, and called the Harnett County Sheriff's Office.  Deputy Sheriff Godrey  arrived at the scene and directed Atkinson to exit the vehicle so that it could be repossessed.  Intimidated by an armed law enforcement officer,  Atkinson complied and Carolina Repo took the car. In addition to bringing suit against Carolina Repo (which was sent to arbitration), Atkinson sued Godfrey and Seriff Wayne Coats alleging a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  Coats & Godfrey  moved to dismiss  pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6),  arguing both that Godfrey's actions were  no more than a “de minimus involvement in a private company’s repossession of Plaintiff’s vehicle . . ..”  and that Godfrey is entitled to qualified immunity.  Further, Coates argued that Atkinson failed to plausibly allege a "policy or custom"  of the Sheriff's office that violated the Constitution. The district court,  however,  held that,  when construed in the light most favorable to Atkinson,  Godfrey's order to exit the vehicle so that Carolina Repo could repossess it was plausibly "active participation"  Citing heavily from   Marcus v. McCollum, 394 F.3d 813 (10th Cir. 2004) with respect to law enforcement involvement in a private repossession  determination of whether Godfrey participated in a manner sufficient to constitute intervention and state action is a fact-intensive issue that involved many factors, including: Whether an officer: Came on the scene: at the request of the repossessor; with the repossessor;  stood in close proximity to the repossessor;  and/or and remained until completion of the repossession. Instructed the vehicle owner: not to interfere with the repossession; that she was not  the rightful owner of the property; and/or To stop interfering or he would go to jail;  Unreasonably: Accepted the documentation of the repossessor; and/or Recognized the rights of the repossessor over those of the debtor; Whether the debtor would have prevented the repossession if police had not been there;  Whether, even if unintentional the officer  intimidated the debtor into not exercising her right to resist. Whether the action of the officer were necessary to keep the peace and deescalate the repossession "[T]he overarching lesson of the case law is that officers may act to diffuse a volatile situation, but may not aid the repossessor in such a way that the repossession would not have occurred but for their assistance."  Marcus v. McCollum, 394 F.3d 813 (10th Cir. 2004). The district court also held that Atkinson's allegations were sufficient to establish violations by Godfrey of her constitutional rights under the 4th and 14th Amendments as  a   “reasonable police officers should know from the established precedent in Fuentes that their role is not to be participants in property deprivations without notice and an opportunity to be heard.”   Abbott v. Latshaw, 164 F.3d 141, 146 (3rd Cir. 1998).  Lastly,  as to Coates,  the district court held that Atkinson pled sufficiently,  even though "upon information and belief",  that the Harnett County Sheriff did have "policies and customs"   that led to the alleged constitutional violations. Commentary: Marxist snark of the day-  It is always good when law enforcement   choses to use the illegal threat of state violence in service of breaches of the peace by  capital.  See  UCC § 9-609. This decision is on appeal to the 4th Circuit Court,.  but it is unclear if NACA, NCLC or other consumer rights organizations are assisting.  There also seems to be some unlikely attorneys,  who normally represent consumers,  appearing for other creditors in this case. To read a copy of the transcript, please see: Blog comments Attachment Document atkinson_v._coats.pdf (220.74 KB) Category Middle District

M.D.N.C.: Atkinson v. Coats- Law Enforcement Officer involvement in Illegal Self-Help Repossession Ed Boltz Wed, 03/20/2024 - 01:39 Summary: When Carolina Repo  attempted a self-help repossession of her car,  Atkinson attempted to drive her vehicle away.  Carolina Repo then slid the tow bar under the car to disable it, demanded that she exit it, and called the Harnett County Sheriff's Office.  Deputy Sheriff Godrey  arrived at the scene and directed Atkinson to exit the vehicle so that it could be repossessed.  Intimidated by an armed law enforcement officer,  Atkinson complied and Carolina Repo took the car. In addition to bringing suit against Carolina Repo (which was sent to arbitration), Atkinson sued Godfrey and Seriff Wayne Coats alleging a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  Coats & Godfrey  moved to dismiss  pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6),  arguing both that Godfrey's actions were  no more than a “de minimus involvement in a private company’s repossession of Plaintiff’s vehicle . . ..”  and that Godfrey is entitled to qualified immunity.  Further, Coates argued that Atkinson failed to plausibly allege a "policy or custom"  of the Sheriff's office that violated the Constitution. The district court,  however,  held that,  when construed in the light most favorable to Atkinson,  Godfrey's order to exit the vehicle so that Carolina Repo could repossess it was plausibly "active participation"  Citing heavily from   Marcus v. McCollum, 394 F.3d 813 (10th Cir. 2004) with respect to law enforcement involvement in a private repossession  determination of whether Godfrey participated in a manner sufficient to constitute intervention and state action is a fact-intensive issue that involved many factors, including: Whether an officer: Came on the scene: at the request of the repossessor; with the repossessor;  stood in close proximity to the repossessor;  and/or and remained until completion of the repossession. Instructed the vehicle owner: not to interfere with the repossession; that she was not  the rightful owner of the property; and/or To stop interfering or he would go to jail;  Unreasonably: Accepted the documentation of the repossessor; and/or Recognized the rights of the repossessor over those of the debtor; Whether the debtor would have prevented the repossession if police had not been there;  Whether, even if unintentional the officer  intimidated the debtor into not exercising her right to resist. Whether the action of the officer were necessary to keep the peace and deescalate the repossession "[T]he overarching lesson of the case law is that officers may act to diffuse a volatile situation, but may not aid the repossessor in such a way that the repossession would not have occurred but for their assistance."  Marcus v. McCollum, 394 F.3d 813 (10th Cir. 2004). The district court also held that Atkinson's allegations were sufficient to establish violations by Godfrey of her constitutional rights under the 4th and 14th Amendments as  a   “reasonable police officers should know from the established precedent in Fuentes that their role is not to be participants in property deprivations without notice and an opportunity to be heard.”   Abbott v. Latshaw, 164 F.3d 141, 146 (3rd Cir. 1998).  Lastly,  as to Coates,  the district court held that Atkinson pled sufficiently,  even though "upon information and belief",  that the Harnett County Sheriff did have "policies and customs"   that led to the alleged constitutional violations. Commentary: Marxist snark of the day-  It is always good when law enforcement   choses to use the illegal threat of state violence in service of breaches of the peace by  capital.  See  UCC § 9-609. This decision is on appeal to the 4th Circuit Court,.  but it is unclear if NACA, NCLC or other consumer rights organizations are assisting.  There also seems to be some unlikely attorneys,  who normally represent consumers,  appearing for other creditors in this case. To read a copy of the transcript, please see: Blog comments Attachment Document atkinson_v._coats.pdf (220.74 KB) Category Middle District

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Bankr. W.D.N.C.: In re Best Wall- Bankruptcy Subject Matter Jurisdiction does not require Financial Distress Ed Boltz Fri, 03/15/2024 - 19:18 Summary: The bankruptcy court found that the lack of financial distress does not deprive  it of subject matter jurisdiction. For a more detailed summary (which will recommend reading the entire 59-page opinion)  see Rochelle's Daily Wire "Lack of Financial Distress Doesn’t Divest a Court of Subject Matter Jurisdiction".Commentary: Judge Beyer provides a very comprehensive  survey of the history of bankruptcy law from the eighteenth century to the present writing that: While the language of the Bankruptcy Clause, the history of American bankruptcy law, and the Supreme Court’s descriptions of the bankruptcy power do not definitively answer, or even directly address, the question of whether constitutional subject matter jurisdiction requires a debtor in financial distress, the absence of support for the Committee’s argument is conspicuous. There are simply no cases at any level (of which this court is aware) that explicitly endorse the proposition that bankruptcy courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction unless a debtor has a sufficient degree of financial distress. This complements the recent law review article, by Rafael Pardo, Rethinking Antebellum Bankruptcy.   This case (which has been appealed to the district court already) and its potential conflict with  In re LTL Management LLC  from the Third Circuit could lead to the Supreme Court to provide more definitive parameters for the scope of the Bankruptcy Clause  beyond relying on the 182 year old opinion of Justice Catron (sitting as a Circuit Judge). To read a copy of the transcript, please see: Blog comments Attachment Document bestwalljurisdiction_compressed.pdf (401.91 KB) Category Western District

N.C. Ct. of App.: Causey v. Southland- Shareholders Cannot Intervene to Insurance Company Liquidation Ed Boltz Fri, 03/15/2024 - 19:14 Summary: The North Carolina Court of Appeals  ruled in the case between Mike Causey, Commissioner of Insurance, and several insurance companies owned by Greg Lindberg, including Southland National Insurance Corporation, Bankers Life Insurance Company, and Colorado Bankers Life Insurance Company. GBIG Holdings, LLC, owned by Lindberg, appealed against the orders directing the liquidation of the insurance companies.    The Court of Appeals held that as a shareholder, GBIG should not have been allowed to intervene and defend against the liquidation petition, as only a company’s directors are permitted to intervene to defend under N.C.G.S. § 58-30-95. Commentary: While it seems more obvious that Causey,  as the North Carolina Commissioner of Insurance,  would seek rehabilitation and eventually liquidation of an insurance company under N.C.G.S § 58‑30 et seq.,  this is yet another case where a failed business is being handled through  avenues other than bankruptcy.   Whether GBIG  would be able to meet the requirements of 11 U.S. Code § 303 to file an involuntary Chapter 11 bankruptcy and seek to  continue the reorganization  there would seem to require at least two other entities holding claims is unknown,  but could remove this case from state to bankruptcy court. To read a copy of the transcript, please see: Blog comments Attachment Document causey_v._southland_insurance.pdf (145.69 KB) Category NC Court of Appeals NC Courts

Law Review: Rafael I. Pardo, Rethinking Antebellum Bankruptcy, 95 U. Colo. L. Rev. __ (2024 forthcoming) Ed Boltz Fri, 03/15/2024 - 19:06 Abstract: Bankruptcy law has been repeatedly reinvented over time in response to changing circumstances. The Bankruptcy Act of 1841—passed by Congress to address the financial ruin caused by the Panic of 1837—constituted a revolutionary break from its immediate predecessor, the Bankruptcy Act of 1800, which was the nation’s first bankruptcy statute. Although Congress repealed the 1841 Act in 1843, the legislation lasted significantly longer than recognized by scholars. The repeal legislation permitted pending bankruptcy cases to be finally resolved pursuant to the Act’s terms. Because debtors flooded the judicially understaffed 1841 Act system with over 46,000 cases, the Act’s administration continued into the 1860s, thereby allowing further development of the law. Importantly, the system operated at a time when the role of the business of slavery in the national economy was increasingly expanding. This Article focuses on two post repeal episodes involving legal innovation under the Act to demonstrate how an expanded periodization of its duration yields fresh insights into understanding the interaction between federal bankruptcy law and slavery: (1) the judicial constitutional settlement of voluntary bankruptcy relief, part of which occurred through a case involving a bankrupt enslaver; and (2) the practice pursuant to which some federal district courts empowered assignees—the federal court officials appointed to administer property surrendered by bankrupts in 1841 Act cases—to operate a bankrupt’s business before liquidating it, as evidenced by certain cases involving plantation owners who sought relief under the Act. Commentary: In revisiting the question,  perhaps last current in regard to the 1841 Bankruptcy Act  but certainly settled by the time of the 1898 Act,  about whether voluntary bankruptcies were  constitutional  or as "insolvencies"  were outside the constitutional grant of authority,  this article may actually have relevance to the contemporaneous issue about whether bankruptcy cases for solvent entities,  see,  for example,  In re Best Wall (blog forthcoming) for a discussion of the Texas-Two Step often used by corporations facing mass tort litigation,  are constitutionally permissible.   See for example how in 1843,  Circuit Justice Catron emphasized the broad power enjoyed by Congress when enacting legislation pursuant to the Bankruptcy Clause:  In considering the question before me, I have not pretended to give a definition, but purposely avoided any attempt to define the mere word “bankruptcy.” It is employed in the constitution in the plural and as part of an expression,—‘the subject of bankruptcies.’ The ideas attached to the word in this connection are numerous and complicated. They form a subject of extensive and complicated legislation. Of this subject congress has general jurisdiction; and the true inquiry is, to what limits is that jurisdiction restricted? I hold it extends to all cases where the law causes to be distributed the property of the debtor among his creditors; this is its least limit. Its greatest is a discharge of the debtor from his contracts. And all intermediate legislation, affecting substance and form, but tending to further the great end of the subject— distribution and discharge—are in the competency and discretion of congress. With the policy of a law, letting in all classes, others as well as traders, and permitting the bankrupt to come in voluntarily, and be discharged without the consent of his creditors, the courts have no concern; it belongs to the law makers. (Emphasis added.) As this article makes clear,  this issue never squarely reached the Supreme Court,  so this 182-year old question of whether "the subject of bankruptcies"  extends to include all debtors,  including those that have sufficient resources to pay creditors,  may remain unanswered. To read a copy of the transcript, please see: Blog comments Attachment Document rethinking_antebellum_bankruptcy_compressed.pdf (854.53 KB) Category Law Reviews & Studies

Law Review: Tavera, Daniel M. - The Unscheduled Creditor in a Chapter 7 Case with Assets, 35 Loy. Consumer L. Rev. 145 Ed Boltz Thu, 03/14/2024 - 17:13 Abstract: This Article analyzes the following question. Is a debt discharged "if the omitted creditor learned of the bankruptcy in time to file a tardy claim that actually was paid the same dividend as timely claims as permitted by § 726(a)(2)(C)?" This Article suggests, in the context of a liquidation, the debt may be discharged. This question is analyzed in three parts. First, this Article reviews the statutes applicable to omitted creditors and the history of the exception to discharge for omitted creditors. Then, this Article examines the case law adopting the plain language approach or the distribution approach. Lastly, before grappling with some implications arising under this split, this Article will address this question of statutory interpretation using principles of statutory construction commonly accepted and frequently cited by the Supreme Court to clarify the issues surrounding the interpretation of the term "timely." Commentary: An excellent survey on the case law in Chapter 7  regarding whether unscheduled debts are discharged.  Largely because many of the cases on this question arose pre-BAPCPA,  when there was more routinely a minimum "good faith"  dividend required to be paid to general unsecured creditors,  there is a dearth of case law or scholarship about whether an unscheduled debt is discharged in Chapter 13.   As it is far more common (and arguably statutorily mandated) that general unsecured  creditors receive the same in Chapter 13  as in Chapter 7,  namely nothing,  in jurisdictions that follow the "distribution approach"   those unscheduled creditors may also be discharged in a 0% Chapter 13 plan.    To read a copy of the transcript, please see: Blog comments Attachment Document the_unscheduled_creditor_in_a_chapter_7_case_with_assets-1_compressed.pdf (787.85 KB) Document the_unscheduled_creditor_in_a_chapter_7_case_with_assets-2_compressed.pdf (868.06 KB) Document the_unscheduled_creditor_in_a_chapter_7_case_with_assets-3_compressed.pdf (370.16 KB) Category Law Reviews & Studies

N.C. Ct. of App: Longphre v. KT Fin.- Date for Accrual of Interest Ed Boltz Wed, 03/13/2024 - 22:08 Summary: The Longphres  loaned KT Financial $330,000 by two separate promissory notes with 30% interest  and specified “[a]ll accrued interest and unpaid principal” was due one year after the notes were executed.  The notes also allowed the Longphres to collect attorney's fees pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 6-21.2 if KT Financial defaulted.   Surprise twist-  KT Financial defaulted. The Longphres demanded repayment of principal and accrued interest on the notes for a total of $546,912.32, eventually bringing suit.  KT Financial argued that the notes were interest free during the first year,  with the trial court agreeing and reducing the amount owed to $450,156.16,  but also awarding attorneys fees of 15%  or $67,523.42.   Second surprise twist-  Everybody  appealed The N.C Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that as the contract was silent as to when interest began to accrue,  N.C.G.S.. § 24-3(1)  controlled and provides that: All bonds, bills, notes, bills of exchange, liquidated and settled accounts shall bear interest from the time they become due . . . unless it is specially expressed that interest is not to accrue until a time mentioned in the said writings or securities. As the date the notes came due was after one year, that is when interest commenced. The NCCOA  rejected KT Financial's argument regarding the award of attorneys fees as without merit. Commentary: While KT Financial's argument regarding the award of attorneys fees was without merit,  since those fees were capped at 15% of the outstanding balance,  raising that argument on appeal was without much risk and would seem to have bled the Longphres.  Presumably their lawyers were still charging for the appeal win or lose. Meaning that even had  the Longphres been successful, the net recovery would have been substantially less than their unrequited desire for $96,756.16  in accrued interest.   To read a copy of the transcript, please see: Blog comments Attachment Document longphre_v._kt_fin._llc.pdf (116.26 KB) Category NC Court of Appeals NC Courts

N.C. Ct. of App.: In re Jones- Validity of Reverse Mortgage not an issue for non-judicial foreclosure Ed Boltz Wed, 03/13/2024 - 04:05 Summary: George Jones qualified for a reverse mortgage on his home with American Advisors Group (AAG) and received the loan counseling  required under N.C.G.S. §53-269 and § 53-270,   with the counselor noting that Mr.  Jones appeared to understand and respond to "most questions".  After Mr.  Jones died,  AAG eventually commenced a non-judicial foreclosure. The Clerk of Court and subsequently the Superior Court denied the foreclosure  finding that the Note was not a valid debt as it failed to satisfy the counseling requirements. The N.C. Court of Appeal  reversed,  finding that  while  “[a] deed executed by an incompetent grantor may be set aside by a suit in equity[.]” In re Godwin, 121 N.C. App. 703, 705, 468 S.E.2d 811, 813 (1996),  that challenge can not be raised in a non-judicial foreclosure hearing,  but must instead  “equitable defenses to the foreclosure . . . should be asserted in an action to enjoin the foreclosure sale under” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 45-21.34.= Commentary: Hopefully  in nearly three years since AAG initiated this non-judicial foreclosure action,  the heirs of Mr.  Jones either commenced their own equitable action in Superior Court to challenge the validity of the note,  found financing to purchase this home  or,  if that has not been decided elsewhere  (meaning there is no Rooker-Feldman bar for the bankruptcy court)  they have considered filing a Chapter 13 bankruptcy and challenging the validity of this mortgage in that venue. To read a copy of the transcript, please see: Blog comments Attachment Document in_re_jones.pdf (100.52 KB) Category NC Court of Appeals NC Courts