Bankr. E.D.N.C.: In re Maynor- Vesting in Chapter 13 and Continued Oversight of Assets Ed Boltz Mon, 02/26/2024 - 22:22 Summary: Through a combination of selecting vesting of assets at confirmation and the use of  nonstandard provisions,  Maynor's plan in essence sought to excuse the requirement from Local Rule 4002-1(g)(4),  which (at the time of this decision*)  provided that: (4) DISPOSITION OF PROPERTY. After the filing of the petition and until the plan is completed, the debtor shall not dispose of any non-exempt property having a fair market value of more than $10,000 by sale or otherwise without prior approval of the trustee and an order of the court.    Additionally,   the Notice and Order to the Debtor, which is issued upon the filing of a chapter 13 case in the E.D.N.C, provides: (4) Financial/Address Changes: You must notify your attorney and the trustee of any change of mailing address or employment. You must notify the court of any change in mailing address. You must also promptly notify your attorney and the trustee of any substantial changes in your financial circumstances, including substantial changes in your income, expenses, or property Ownership. . . .    (10) Disposition of Property: You must not dispose of any non-exempt property having a fair market value of more than $10,000.00 by sale or otherwise without prior approval of the trustee and an order of this court. The Chapter 13 Trustee objected to confirmation,   based on the "the over-arching and troubling question" of  these provisions,  which had been rejected on multiple previous by the bankruptcy and district courts in the E.D.N.C.,  see, e.g.,  In re Skilling (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Oct. 10, 2022)  intended “to limit the debtor’s obligations under the Order and Notice, or to obfuscate and confuse the trustee as to his intention with respect to this or any of the other nonstandard provisions of the Plan.” The bankruptcy court  agreed,  holding that  the "continuing interest in 'the preservation of the debtor’s financial situation,' the bankruptcy process is dependent upon disclosure and transparency."   Continuing,  in strikingly strong language ("Repetition alone, with no new binding law and no unique factual circumstances, is now and will remain insufficient."),  the bankruptcy court indicated that, despite concerns about issuing an advisory opinion  (and perhaps exercising more restraint that the 4th Circuit Court of Appeals seemed to require in its oddball Kiviti v. Bhatt decision),  it would " articulate the bases upon which it will not confirm plans that include provisions that are identical in substance, form, or intent" to those proposed here. The court began by drawing the distinction between exemptions for things in themselves,  for example "professionally prescribed health aids'', see  N.C.G.S. § 1C‑1601(a)(7),  and exemptions   for a specified value,  for example, most pertinently in this case and generally the $35,000  homestead exemption at N.C.G.S. § 1C‑1601(a)(1).     While acknowledging that Local Rule 4002-1(g)(4) can be read in more than one way,  the court found the practical understanding of the rule  requires that  that if,   at the time property is ultimately sold, the fair market value exceeds $10,000 over liens plus the claimed exemption, then court authority is required to sell the property. In regardings to what continued authority the court has over property that vested in the debtor at confirmation,  while recognizing that the interplay of 11 U.S.C.  § § 1306(a) and 1327(b) "has confounded courts" and that the 4th Circuit has not specifically adopted any of the five vesting theories,  the bankruptcy court nonetheless found that the 4th Circuit decisions in  Murphy v.O’Donnell (In re Murphy) (4th Cir. 2007) and  Arnold v. Weast (In re Arnold), 869 F.2d 240 (4th Cir. 1989),  held that  “a debtor cannot use plan confirmation as a license to shield himself from the reach of his creditors when he experiences a substantial and unanticipated change in his income.”   As such,  the bankruptcy court held that,  absent a reversal of Murphy,  the Fourth Circuit would  reject the estate termination,  estate transformation or estate replenish approach as adopted in the  In re Elassal, 654 B.R. 434 (Bankr. E.D.Mich. 2023) opinion.  Under the remaining vesting theories which the 4th Circuit could adopt,  viz.  estate preservation, conditional vesting or estate replenishment as applied in  Barbosa v. Soloman, (1st Cir. 2000),  ann would still subject the debtor to oversight regarding the disposition of  assets. Commentary: *  The proposed amendment to Local Rule 4002-1(g), a copy of which is attached, would instead provide: (4) DISPOSITION OF PROPERTY. After the filing of the petition and until the plan is completed, the debtor shall not dispose of any non-exempt property (whether vested or not) having a fair market value of more than $10,000 with non-exempt equity in excess of $12,000 by sale or otherwise without prior approval of the trustee and an order of the court. “Non-exempt equity” shall be calculated using the fair market value of the property as of the date of sale or transfer after subtracting the amount of any claimed, allowed exemption and the petition date amount of any non-avoidable lien. And,  as before,  leaving aside the theories of vesting and attempts at procedural asymmetric warfare in Chapter 13,  the root of this issue is that the homestead exemption in North Carolina is outdated and woefully inadequate,  leaving Chapter 13 Debtors in particular,  due to the plans lasting as long as five years,  often forced into the Hobson's choice of either remaining in their home despite opportunities and obligations that would urge selling and relocating or  selling that property and only keeping proceeds that will be insufficient for homeownership elsewhere.  The better solution would be for the North Carolina Bar Bankruptcy Section to work towards reasonable exemption reform. To read a copy of the transcript, please see: Blog comments Attachment Document 2024_proposed_amendments.pdf (108.13 KB) Document in_re_maynor.pdf (321.99 KB) Category North Carolina Bankruptcy Cases Eastern District

Here’s How You Can Make Your Chapter 13 Payments in the Alexandria VA Bankruptcy Court The bankruptcy law tells you to make your first Chapter 13 payment one month after your bankruptcy case is filed.  If you forget, or bounce, your first payment, the Chapter 13 trustee can dismiss your case. (That means DO NOT wait until your Chapter 13 plan is approved–that will be three or four months down the road. Start making payments now!). That’s by law. 11 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(1). When the Court confirms your plan, then the trustee may issue a “wage directive” to garnish the payment from your paycheck. If that doesn’t happen, you need just to keep making those payments. Ten Things to know about how to make your Chapter 13 payments: 1.The Alexandria Chapter 13 Trustee, Thomas Gorman, does not accept cash, credit, or debit cards. He also won’t take online or telephone payments.  Mail your payments to his address in Memphis. (That bank in Memphis handles the payments for most of the bankruptcy courts in the country.) 2. Do not send money orders. They are too difficult to track down and get your money back if they get lost in the mail.  Instead, I suggest setting up a bill pay with your bank. With bill pay, your bank mails the check. You can watch your account and see when the check clears.   3. Don’t send a post-dated check. The Memphis bank will deposit it as soon as they get it. So, don’t send your check until you’re sure it’s good. 4. The bank won’t put a bounced check through a second time. Just send a new check. 5. Don’t use UPS or FedEx. The payment address is a PO Box in Memphis. UPS and FEDEX don’t deliver to PO Boxes.   6. If you bounce your check twice, then Thomas Gorman will make you to send all future payments by money order or cashiers check. That’s an enormous waste of time. It’s better to be late than to bounce a check. 7. If your check doesn’t clear your bank, don’t call to ask the Trustee if they got it. They don’t know. That bank in Memphis is handling over a hundred thousand Chapter 13 payments every month! If the bank doesn’t deposit your check, then you know it’s lost in the mail. Send it again. 8. Make your check payable to: Thomas P. Gorman, Trustee 9. Include your NAME and CASE NUMBER on your check. For bill paying purposes, your case number is your account number.  If you get that wrong, your payment might go to the wrong account.  People mail three thousand checks every day to that bank; so make sure yours has the right account number. I like setting up bill pay with your bank as the best way to make your Chapter 13 payment.   10. Mail all payments to the payment address at:                Thomas P. Gorman                Chapter 13 Trustee                P.O. Box 1553                Memphis, TN                       38101-1553 And Remember to Pay:   Trustee Gorman will not send you a monthly reminder or call when you are late. It is up to you to make sure he receives your payment every month.  

Many Pennsylvania residents rely on long-term disability benefits in order to get the income they need to live fruitful lives. Obtaining those benefits, however, can sometimes be a challenge. Long-term disability programs can be extremely competitive and have strict requirements that must be met in order to qualify. Insurance companies may also want to try to deny benefits in order to avoid paying out an expensive policy. They have every incentive to fight back, at least initially, against a long-term disability claim. Individuals trying to navigate the long-term disability landscape on their own may run into complications they simply do not have the time to handle. When that happens, you need experienced legal counsel to help you out. Our attorneys can help you with long-term disability claims or appeals by being ardent advocates for you. We can collect evidence for your claim or appeal, talk to insurance providers on your behalf, and make sure that your applications and other forms are properly filed with the appropriate entities. To have our Pennsylvania long-term disability lawyers start helping you with your claim or appeal, call Young, Marr, Mallis & Associates at (215) 515-2954. Why Hire Our Long-Term Disability Claim Lawyers in Pennsylvania? Some people may believe that they can handle the process of a long-term disability claim or appeal by themselves. This is not an advisable idea. You are at a serious disadvantage if you do not hire legal representation like our Philadelphia long-term disability lawyers. First, the process of obtaining long-term disability benefits is complicated and requires many steps. Our lawyers know how to deal with this process, while the average person does not have experience with these filings. Second, there are a lot of forms, paperwork, and other time-consuming things that need to be done that are associated with long-term disability claims. Our attorneys can assist you with these tasks. Finally, insurance companies that provide these services are not always on your side. Insurance providers are never in the business of always providing coverage; otherwise, they would not make any money. For that reason, your insurance may not want to give you coverage when you need it. Let our lawyers negotiate with them so that you can focus on other important things. Private Disability Claims vs Federal Programs in Pennsylvania Generally, disability claims or appeals will be going to private insurance companies, not government programs like SSA or SSDI. for each kind of long-term disability claim. You really do need legal assistance when dealing with these entities, as the process is complicated, and someone who does not have legal experience can get tripped up and have their application denied when they are truly deserving of approval. Private insurance companies are in the business of making a profit. They do this by providing a service – having coverage for you in the event that you become disabled either for a long time or permanently. However, their objective is not necessarily to help you out. This means that a private long-term disability insurance provider may not be willing to approve your claim if they do not believe it will be profitable. They will look for loopholes to get out of their obligation to provide coverage. Our attorneys know how to handle this type of behavior and will make sure that private insurers give you the coverage they said they would. What Can You Do to Prepare for a Long-Term Disability Claim or Appeal in Pennsylvania? There are a number of things you can do to assist our lawyers in advocating for your long-term disability claim. Some of these things are for your own well-being and personal benefit, while others are critical for success in a long-term disability claim or appeal with the help of our legal team. Understand the Program You are Applying For It can be helpful to do some independent light research on your insurance policy so you know what to expect. Insurance providers will likely have some front-facing information from which you can glean important details. Of course, this will doubtless try to spin them in a positive light. Your experience with the insurance company may be very different from the face they put forward in ads and other places. Our attorneys would be more than happy to help you with this process and fill in any gaps or answer questions you may have about these programs. Collect Medical Records Your medical records are very important to the success of a long-term disability claim. These records can help prove that you are, in fact, disabled and deserving of coverage. Our attorneys can help you track down and compile these medical records. Notify Medical Professionals If you regularly see a physician or other medical professional, you should make them aware that you are seeking long-term disability coverage. Your medical provider can advocate for you to insurance companies and federal programs to help your claim or appeal get approved. Continue Getting Treatment If you are already getting treatment for a long-term disability, you should continue to do so. Your health and well-being always take priority over legal matters. Moreover, continued treatment can be used as evidence that you are disabled and bolster your long-term disability claim. This is especially true if you are appealing an initial denial of long-term disability, as stopping treatment can be used to support an assertion that you are not disabled and do not need the assistance of disability insurance or a federal program. Speak to Our Pennsylvania Long-Term Disability Lawyers Now Young, Marr, Mallis & Associates has Quakertown, PA long-term disability lawyers standing by to start assisting you with your claim or appeal when you call (215) 515-2954.

Bankr. E.D.N.C.: In re Purdy- Dismissal with Prejudice for Forged Letter Ed Boltz Mon, 02/26/2024 - 04:05 Summary: The Purdys filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy and were subject to the local form Order and Notice, which imposed,  among other requirements  and restrictions,  that they obtain prior approval from the bankruptcy court before incurring new debts in excess of $10,000.  Two years later,  on December 8, 2021,  the Purdys moved to incur a mortgage to finance a home.  While the Trustee did not object to that motion,  the bankruptcy court sua sponte denied the motion (including a subsequent denial of a motion to reconsider) on January 5,  2022.  In April of 2022,  after being provided information regarding the Purdy's income,  the Trustee discovered that they were making a monthly mortgage payment,  having gone forward with the purchase and financing of a home- despite the earlier denial by the bankruptcy court.  While continuing to pursue the mortgage financing,  Ms.  Purdy, shaving the truth far too close, informed the lender that the Trustee had not opposed the motion and provided a letter that appeared to be on the Trustee's letterhead and to include his signature stating that "[o]ut office fully supports Marcus and Amanda Purdy obtaining a mortgage." This letter was a forgery by Ms. Purdy. The Trustee moved to dismiss the Purdy's case and following a hearing on September 27, 2022,  the bankruptcy dismissed the case with prejudice.  The Purdys appealed arguing that the bankruptcy court erred in admitting the forged letter into evidence as they had not contested that they had violated the local Order and Notice.  The district court upheld the admission of the forged letter,  as it was relevant to the Purdys' opposition to the motion to dismiss their case.  The district court also declined to consider the "irrelevant and baseless" arguments raised by Purdy's that their self-described "housing decision" caused no damage to any party or that the local rules  were "unconstitutionally nonuniform",  abridged substantive rights and violated the separation of powers.  The district court also upheld the dismissal with prejudice and further referred the matter to the U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of North Carolina. Commentary: The argument by the Purdys that their fraud should be excused as it did not cause any damage to any party  was similarly recently rejected in New York v.  Trump. Despite the referral, it does not yet  appear in PACER that any criminal charges have been brought against Ms.  Purdy or any other party. For a copy of the opinion, please see: To read a copy of the transcript, please see: To read a copy of the transcript, please see: Blog comments Attachment Document in_re_purdy.pdf (160.97 KB) Document purdy_appellees_brief.pdf (393.34 KB) Document purdy_reply_brief.pdf (92.05 KB) Document purdy_appellants_brief_compressed_3.pdf (525.8 KB) Category North Carolina Bankruptcy Cases Eastern District

4th Circuit: Choi v. Hyon- Actual Fraudulent Intent and Willful Injury Ed Boltz Sun, 02/25/2024 - 20:26 Summary: The Court of Appeals upheld the bankruptcy and district court opinions finding that Hyon did not act with fraudulent intent as required by  In re Biondo, 180 F.3d 126, 134 (4th Cir. 1999).  Next,  the Court of Appeals also upheld the determinations by the lower courts that  “[t]he word ‘willful’ in [(523)](a)(6) modifies the word ‘injury,’ indicating that nondischargeability takes a deliberate or intentional injury, not merely a deliberate or intentional act that leads to injury.” Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 61 (1998), or more simply the injury must be willful and intended not merely the act that led to the injury. Commentary: This case again explicitly shows the deference that appellate courts will show to the finder of fact in these cases. For a copy of the opinion, please see:   Blog comments Attachment Document choi_v._hyon.pdf (122.4 KB) Category Law Reviews & Studies

Social media has become a defining characteristic of our times, and millions of people use it daily. While you might think your social media is harmless fun, it can be used against you in a legal setting, like a Workers’ Compensation claim. An insurance company might use social media to deny your Workers’ Compensation claim. This tends to come up when the things a person posts on social media do not align with their claims. For example, photos or videos of you appearing uninjured shortly after your accident might be used to deny your claims. Unfortunately, much of what is posted online lacks context, and you might be wrongfully denied. The insurance company might obtain your social media information if it is publicly available. If you have strict privacy settings, they might get your information from people who know you. If all else fails, the insurance company might try to get a court order compelling you to hand over your social media. Talk to an attorney about how to protect yourself. To get a free, private case evaluation, call our Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation lawyers of Young, Marr, Mallis & Associates at (215) 515-2954. How Social Media Might Be Used Against You in a Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Case When you begin a Workers’ Compensation case, your claims may be subject to scrutiny and investigation by your employer’s insurance company. The insurance company is responsible for making payments if your claims are approved, and they may refuse to cover you if they believe your injuries and accident do not qualify you for Workers’ Compensation benefits. The extent of the insurance company’s investigations might surprise you, and social media is not off-limits. The insurance company may take information from your public social media profiles in the course of their investigations. They might also take information from other people’s public social media profiles that you were unaware had been posted. For example, you might not post anything on your own social media after the accident, but someone who knows you might. Alternatively, other people involved in the accident at work might have posted about it online. Even if they were uninjured and did not file a Workers’ Compensation claim, their social media might be used against you. Another possibility is that someone close to you might snap a picture or record a video of you and post it online. If the insurance company finds this, they might use it against it. A good question to ask yourself is what your social media suggests about you after the crash. Usually, insurance companies are looking for evidence they can use to deny your Workers’ Compensation claim. For example, photos or videos of you appearing uninjured after the accident or posts that contradict your story about how your accident happened might be used to undermine your claims. How the Insurance Company Might Obtain Your Social Media in a Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Case Social media details are sometimes easier to get than people realize. If you have a public profile that anyone may view, it is extremely easy for the insurance company to look you up and make copies of anything you have posted. Details about your accident and injuries might also be available through others who can access your social media. You might have coworkers who follow you online, or you have approved as friends on your social media. The insurance company might ask your coworkers about what you have posted on your social media. The insurance company might instead obtain information from other social media accounts you do not control and have nothing to do with. For example, a coworker, friend, or family member who knows about the accident might post about it online without talking to you first. They might disclose details about how the accident happened or your injuries that undermine your claims. The insurance company can also seek a court order for your social media. To do this, they usually must prove to the court that your social media contains important evidence relevant to the case. Our Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation lawyers can work to get such a court order denied. How to Prevent Social Media from Being Used Against You in a Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Case Perhaps the best way to prevent an insurance company or some other opposing party from using your social media against you is to totally avoid posting anything online after your workplace accident. If you never put anything on your social media, there is nothing that can be used to undermine your claim. If you must post, get approval from your attorney first to avoid accidentally disclosing private information that could be used to deny your claims. People sometimes post information about an on-the-job accident so that their friends and family know they are okay. If you do this, avoid giving away too many details about the accident and your injuries. It would be best if you restricted who can see your social media profiles. Double-check to make sure none of your profiles are publicly available. Set the highest privacy setting possible. Avoid approving any new friend or follower requests, as you never know who might be behind those profiles. Do not delete your social media accounts or anything you have posted. If the insurance company wants to see your social media, but you have deleted it, they might accuse you of trying to destroy evidence. If the insurance company tries to get a court order compelling you to hand over your social media, there might be a few different ways to approach the problem. First, we can convince the court that your social media is not relevant and does not need to be disclosed to the insurance company. This can be an effective strategy for those with social media but do not use it often. Your social media is likely not very useful evidence if you have not posted anything online in a long time. If the insurance company will likely get the court order they need to obtain your social media, we can work with them and the court to restrict what kind of access they have. We can argue that they should not have access to any of your social from before the accident, as it is private and otherwise irrelevant. Call Our Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Attorneys for Support Now To get a free, private case evaluation, call our Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation lawyers of Young, Marr, Mallis & Associates at (215) 515-2954.

Bankr. W.D.N.C.: In re Kennedy- Reasonable Mortgage Attorney Fee's in Chapter 11 Ed Boltz Sun, 02/25/2024 - 01:05 Abstract   Title 11 of the United States Code (the “Bankruptcy Code”) provides a fresh start to the “honest but unfortunate debtor.” Chapter 7 therefore permits a debtor to “discharge their outstanding debts in exchange for liquidating their nonexempt assets and distributing them to their creditors.” Dismissals in chapter 7 are governed by section 707 of the Bankruptcy Code. Section 707(a) governs all chapters of bankruptcy filings and applies when adequate “cause” is shown. There is currently a circuit split regarding whether a debtor’s lack of good faith constitutes cause for dismissal under section 707(a). Under section 707(a), a case may only be dismissed for cause after notice and hearing. Section 707 does not define “cause,” offering only a non-exhaustive list of what may constitute cause. This includes unreasonable delay, nonpayment of fees, and failure to file required information on motion of the U.S. Trustee. As a result, bankruptcy courts are given significant discretion when asked to determine whether there is cause to dismiss under section 707. This is a fact-based inquiry. Courts have found cause to dismiss, for example, where the administration of the estate would require the Trustee to operate the debtor’s business in violation of federal law, or where the dismissal would further the judicial economy without harm to either the debtor or their creditors. This article explores the circuit split surrounding whether a debtor’s lack of good faith is cause for dismissal under section 707(a). Part I analyzes the approaches of the various circuits, beginning with the majority view established by the Sixth Circuit in In re Zick that bad faith is grounds for dismissal. Part II analyzes case law on the issue of bad faith dismissals out of lower courts within the Second Circuit, which has not yet heard the issue. The article concludes with a finding that the Second Circuit is likely to follow the Sixth Circuit’s approach in Zick and accept a debtor’s bad faith as grounds for dismissal under section 707(a) in cases of egregious misconduct. Commentary: The lead case on bad faith under 11 U.S.C. § 707(a)  in the Fourth Circuit is Janvey v. Romero,  which does reserve such dismissals to "cases of real misconduct"  and "serious abuses of the bankruptcy process". For a copy of this article, please see:   Blog comments Attachment Document bad_faith_dismissals_in_chapter_7.pdf (285.11 KB) Category Law Reviews & Studies

Even if you yourself do not have it, social media is ever-present in our lives. Literally billions of people worldwide use platforms like Instagram, TikTok, X/Twitter, Facebook, and more. Many details about someone can be found on social media platforms. There are countless stories of people getting fired, relationships ending, and other bad things happening because of something that came to light on social media platforms. Recently, attorneys have begun to look at the social media platforms of clients and opponents to try and get an edge. If you are looking to obtain or keep disability benefits, this can be troubling. It is entirely possible that things like Facebook and Instagram will be used to try and hurt your disability claim. Interested parties can find things you post, both public and “private,” and use them against you if they work against what you say is true in your disability claim. However, it is also true that social media is only a glimpse into someone’s life, so something that may initially appear compromising may simply be misunderstood by whoever is looking at it. For a free review of your situation by our New Jersey disability attorneys, contact Young, Marr, Mallis & Associates at (609) 557-3081. How Do Posts on Social Media Harm Disability Claims in NJ? Of all the reasons that a claim or application for disability coverage may be denied, a social media post is probably not the first thing that comes to mind. However, online posts can hinder efforts to get disability coverage in more ways than you may initially expect. Your Posts Show Lack of Disability One way that social media posts hurt individuals seeking disability coverage is by demonstrating to insurance companies and application evaluators that you are not, in fact, disabled. For example, suppose you claim you are disabled because you cannot perform basic physical tasks, and after you submit your application, you post videos of yourself kayaking on vacation. That video clearly would show that you are not as totally disabled as you claimed to be. Accordingly, you may be denied coverage by an insurance provider or government program. It also does not matter whether these posts are public or private. There are various ways of getting access to “private” things on social apps. So, if your public-facing page is squeaky clean, but there are private videos showing a lack of disability, you may still be in hot water. Other People’s Posts Your social media pages are not the only ones you need to worry about. Things other people put out online can also compromise your claim. For example, if you claim disability, but a friend’s Facebook page has a video of dancing during a night out, that could raise suspicions as to the extent of your disability. Will Disability Insurance Providers Really Look at My Social Media in NJ? Private insurance companies will absolutely prowl through your social media presence to see if you actually need coverage. Insurance companies are not in the business of paying out every policy all of the time, so they are going to make sure that it makes sense to provide coverage. If you believe there is anything that may raise some eyebrows on your social media pages – even if you are completely deserving of disability coverage – you should discuss it with our NJ disability lawyers so that we can address it when it inevitably comes up. There are different rules for federal programs evaluating whether you are disabled. These programs can generally only look at your social media presence if they suspect you of fraud per HALLEX § I-3-2-40 – a set of rules the SSA uses when hearing claims. Tips For Social Media Use When Applying for Disability in NJ Our Mount Laurel, NJ disability attorneys have put together some tips and tricks to help make sure that your disability application process goes as smoothly as possible. It is important to manage your social media pages during that time because even innocuous posts may sound proverbial alarm bells for someone looking at your application. Limit How Much You Post One important thing to do is limit how much of your life you make available online. Try to keep social media postings to a minimum as you go through the application process. This way, there are fewer chances that someone can take a post out of context and put your claim into question. If you are going to post something, avoid posting things that make it look like you are not disabled. For example, if you are going to post yourself doing a physical activity prior to becoming disabled, it may be best to hold off posting it until after your claim is approved. Even then, if you’re going to post it, be sure that it is crystal clear that this is not a recent video. Additionally, do not post about your disability, work, or other things directly related to your claim. Let Friends Know Your Situation Talk to friends and acquaintances and let them know that you do not want them to post anything that could make it harder for you to acquire the coverage and benefits you are entitled to. A well-meaning friend could inadvertently post something that would tip off someone looking at your claim. Google Yourself One trick you can use to find anything that may make your disability claim more difficult is typing your name into a search engine and seeking what comes up. You might be surprised. If anything troubling for your claim does come up, it is better if our lawyers know about it so we can address it. Talk to Our New Jersey Disability Lawyers About Your Claim Young, Marr, Mallis & Associates’ Passaic, NJ disability lawyers can answer any questions and address any concerns you have about your claim when you contact us at (609) 557-3081.

Law Review: Bruckner, Matthew A. and Charron-Chenier, Raphael and Grooms, Jevay- , Bankruptcy in Black and White: The Effect of Race and Bankruptcy Code Exemptions on Wealth (December 8, 2023) Ed Boltz Fri, 02/23/2024 - 19:07 Abstract:   Bankruptcy law in the United States is race-neutral on its face but, in practice, race matters in bankruptcy outcomes. Our original research provides an empirical look at how the facially neutral laws that allow debtors to retain assets in bankruptcy cases result in disparate outcomes for Black and white debtors. Racial differences in asset retention in bankruptcy cases play a role in perpetuating wealth inequality between Black and white debtors. Existing bankruptcy data lacks individual-level characteristics such as race, which inhibits researchers’ ability to adequately assess biases or unintended consequences of laws and policies on subsets of the population. Thus, we construct a novel data set using bankruptcy data from Washington D.C. in 2011 and imputing race. The data demonstrates that facially race-neutral bankruptcy laws contribute to racially disparate outcomes by allowing white debtors to keep larger amounts of both personal and real property. First, exemption laws allow every bankruptcy filer to retain some personal property even if they do not repay their creditors in full. At the median, white filers in the District of Columbia claimed $10,150 in exemptions, relative to $8,359 for Black filers. In other words, the median white filer kept roughly $1,800 more of their property than Black filers, despite reporting similar overall personal property values. Second, exemption laws allow every bankruptcy filer to retain some (or all) equity in their home. Unlike personal property, where Black and white debtors enter bankruptcy with about the same amount of property, white debtors enter bankruptcy with more home equity than Black debtors ($585,000 compared with $251,600 at the median). Unsurprisingly, then, white debtors also leave bankruptcy with more home equity (e.g., the median Black filer retains roughly 80% less in home equity than white filers). Although bankruptcy laws do not inflate the value of white filers’ personal or real property values relative to Black debtors, our exemption rules contribute to white debtors leaving bankruptcy with greater wealth than Black debtors. By protecting certain assets like home equity, which are unevenly distributed in our sample across Black and white debtors, bankruptcy law appears to play a role in perpetuating wealth inequality. Even where assets are more evenly distributed, as personal property was in our sample, bankruptcy law leaves Black debtors with a less robust “fresh start” than white debtors. Commentary: Presumably because this is a descriptive empirical study, rather than a prescriptive policy argument,  it is nonetheless unfortunate that there are no recommendations for changes that increase the equity of bankruptcy exemptions.  It would seem, including from the date in this article, that any increase in exemptions,  while beneficial to Black debtors, might still be of greater benefit to white debtors.  Whether the detriment of any widening of the wealth gap between the cohorts of white and Black debtors exiting bankruptcy would exceed the benefits to individual debtors in protecting a greater amount of assets is perhaps an Original Position question for political philosophers. Not practicing in Washington, D.C.,  I might be wildly speculating,  but elsewhere case law allows for the exemption of any interest in real estate,  including a  leasehold (think back to the bundle of sticks from Property Law 101).  This could allow an unlimited exemption in security deposits and prepaid rent  as those are an  "interest in real property"  under D.C. Code § 15–501,  providing greater equity in the liberal application of exemptions in favor of debtors,  with particular benefit for Black debtors,  who have disproportionate rates of renting rather than home ownership.  I am grateful that  the authors of this paper  have been more accurate in comparing Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 by noting that "[a]s a practical matter, however, there may be little difference in creditor recovery rates if a chapter 13 debtor lacks any 'disposable income' or a chapter 7 debtor lacks any non-exempt property."  This marks a hopeful improvement in the academic literature that far too often previously routinely asserted that Chapter 13 debtors are required to pay more to unsecured creditors.  In fact,  both because of the Chapter 13 debtor is actually allowed to pay less to creditors,  both based on Mean Test deductions for retirement contributions and because the Best Interests of the Creditors analysis  allows Chapter 13 debtors to retain the hypothetical costs of liquidation (basically a secret exemption for the Trustee's Fees and Costs)).     Next maybe academics might start to  revisit with a more nuanced view the success rate of Chapter 13, which may not be nearly as dour as the recurrent  but perhaps dated statement that "[o]nly about one-third of chapter 13 cases end with the debtor receiving a discharge of their remaining debts." To read a copy of the transcript, please see: Blog comments Attachment Document black_and_white_the_effect_of_race_and_bankruptcy_code_exemptions_on_wealth_compressed_1.pdf (713.67 KB) Category Law Reviews & Studies Ed Boltz: Bankruptcy Attorney News

Bankr. M.D.N.C.: In re Adams- Sale of Residence is Substantial and Unanticipated Change in Circumstances resulting in new liquidation analysis Ed Boltz Fri, 02/23/2024 - 07:20 Summary: Adams initially filed  a pro se Chapter 7 bankruptcy disclosing his residence  on Schedule A of his petition,  stating that its value was "Unknown", but, after the Chapter 7 Trustee took preliminary steps to sell the property,  Adams hire an attorney, filed an amendment asserting a value of $260,000 and converted the case to Chapter 13.  The Chapter 13 plan was confirmed with a requirement of $79,705.55 dividend under the Best Interests of the Creditors test.  Six months after confirmation,  Adams sought to sell his residence for $289,000,  with the Trustee then seeking,  through a subsequent Motion to Modify,  to increase the liquidation requirement to $109,043. The bankruptcy court, relying on In re Murphy, 474 F.3d 143 (4th Cir. 2007),  rejected Adams' argument that the original $79,705  requirement was res judicata,  finding that the sale constituted a "substantial change" in Adam's financial circumstances that was "unanticipated" at confirmation. As a result under 11 U.S.C. §1329(a), the modified or "amended"  plan  required a new analysis of the Best Interests of Creditors as of the “as of the effective date of [that] plan.” The bankruptcy court did, nonetheless,  allow Adams to retain not only his homestead exemption,  but also “any amount of proceeds attributable to principal reduction resulting from Debtor’s post-petition payments and any portion of the liquidation value previously paid to creditors in this case.” Commentary: As again, this case points to the insufficiency of the homestead exemption in North Carolina,  as the $35,000 that Adams was allowed to retain is certainly insufficient for a down payment on nearly any home.  Hopefully exemption reform is something that the North Carolina Bar Association Bankruptcy Section will take up soon. Additionally, with  a mortgage owed,  per the Proof of Claim,  of $135,255.64,  it would seem that at the time of confirmation,  the  Best Interests of the Creditors analysis  may not have taken into account the hypothetical  costs of the Chapter 7 Trustee,  which would have been $6,437,  reducing the required dividend to as little as approximately $57,308.00. Similarly, even once the property was sold,  the Best Interests of the Creditors test at 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4) still only requires that unsecured claims receive "not less than the amount that would be paid on such claim if the estate of the debtor were liquidated under chapter 7."  This would still reduce the amount paid to unsecured creditors by the hypothetical Chapter 7 Trustee's commission of approximately $7,742.  As that amount would not be paid to unsecured creditors in a Chapter 7,  it should instead have been retained by Adams.  The point of the Best Interest of Creditors test is not to ensure that the debtor feels the same pain as in Chapter 7,  but that creditors get the same benefit. This is another of the advantages that Congress included to encourage Chapter 13 over Chapter 7,  but one that courts,  overzealous Chapter 13 Trustees and even debtor's attorneys,  when too fixated on other failed arguments,  do not always seem to recognize. This case, and others on the same issue,  were discussed extensively during the ABI presentation Post-Petition Appreciation: When Things Go Up, Who Gets What? For a copy of the opinion, please see: Blog comments Attachment Document in_re_adams.pdf (731.98 KB) Category North Carolina Bankruptcy Cases Middle District