Article: Moran, Cathy- Tracking Down the Illusive Mortgage Interest Deduction Ed Boltz Mon, 03/11/2024 - 16:25 There's an argument that Chapter 13 Trustees should, at least in some plans, be sending debtors 1098s. From the IRS instructions: ________ Collection agents. Generally, if you receive reportable interest payments (other than points) on behalf of someone else and you are the first person to receive the interest, such as a servicing bank collecting payments for a lender, you must file this form. Enter your name, address, TIN, and telephone number in the recipient entity area. You must file this form even though you do not include the interest received in your income but you merely transfer it to another person. If you wish, you may enter the name of the person for whom you collected the interest in box 10. The person for whom you collected the interest need not file Form 1098. However, there is an exception to this rule for any period that (a) the first person to receive or collect the interest does not have the information needed to report on Form 1098, and (b) the person for whom the interest is received or collected would receive the interest in its trade or business if the interest were paid directly to such person. If (a) and (b) apply, the person on whose behalf the interest is received or collected is required to report on Form 1098. If interest is received or collected on behalf of another person other than an individual, such person is presumed to receive the interest in a trade or business. ______ Governmental unit. A governmental unit (or any subsidiary agency) receiving mortgage interest from an individual of $600 or more must file this form. (Red emphasis added above.) _______ When its a simple cure and maintain plan, regardless of whether the on-going payment is made directly or through a conduit, the trustee meets both criteria for the exception, namely she doesn't have the month by month break down of the interest and principal and the mortgage servicer, for whom the payment is collected, would better be able to provide that 1098 to the debtor/homeowner/taxpayer. But when the home mortgage is being paid in full or crammed down during the plan, since the Trustee is presumably paying the Till rate, which is likely different from the contract rate, on the claim, she's the one that knows which portions of disbursements are for interest. It doesn't require much skepticism about the competence of mortgage servicers to question whether 1098s in these cases would accurately report interest paid. I don't know how common that is in San Francisco, where the author is, but in North Carolina and elsewhere, plans regularly have mobile homes or modest 2nd mortgages that get paid either in full or FMV. Failing to send Debtors a 1098 could not only be problematic under the IRC, but also fail to maximize tax refunds for the benefit of the debtor and, more importantly from the Trustee's perspective, the estate. Even further would be the question of whether, when paying interest to unsecured creditors, because the non-exempt equity in the debtor's home requires a 100% dividend, whether that plan in effect "secures" those creditors making that interest deductible and a 1098 appropriate. To read a copy of the transcript, please see: Blog comments Attachment Document tracking_down_the_illusive_mortgage_interest_deduction_-_the_academy.pdf (525.45 KB) Document i1098.pdf (165.51 KB) Category Law Reviews & Studies
U.S. Seeks to Collect on Up to $20 Billion in Delinquent Covid LoansThe Wall Street Journal is reporting in an article dated March 7, 2024 that the U.S. is seeking to collect $20 Billion in delinquent SBA EIDL Covid loans from small businesses and not for profit entities. The article can be found at https://www.wsj.com/business/u-s-seeks-to-collect-on-up-to-20-billion-in-delinquent-covid-loans-96dd36c6?mod=business_lead_storyThe SBA announced that delinquent Covid EIDL loans with balances of $100,000 or less will be sent to the Treasury Department for collection.The referral is sent to Treasury Direct, which can seize government benefits such as portions of Social Security payments and tax refunds.Additionally, in our experience Treasury Direct can and will assess a 30% penalty on the unpaid balance of defaulted SBA EIDL loans (a point not covered in the article).Moreover, borrowers who default may have to recognize Cancellation of Debt income, which is ordinary income under section 108 of the Internal Revenue Code (another point not covered in the article).Many small businesses never intended to repay the loans, hoping they would be forgiven like PPP loans; however, this is not the case.Borrowers with questions about defaulted SBA EIDL loans should contact Jim Shenwick, Esq. Jim has an LLM in Taxation from NYU law school and he is familiar with the Cancellation of Debt tax issues. Jim Shenwick, Esq 917 363 3391 jshenwick@gmail.com Please click the link to schedule a telephone call with me.https://calendly.com/james-shenwick/15minWe held individuals & businesses with too much debt!---Jim Shenwick, Esq Blog SBA EIDL Posts:SBA EIDL Loan Charge Offshttps://shenwick.blogspot.com/2024/02/sba-eidl-loan-charge-offs.htmlSBA EIDL LOANS & CIVIL & CRIMINAL PENALTIES & BANKRUPTCY FILING Shttps://shenwick.blogspot.com/2024/01/sba-eidl-loans-civil-criminal-penalties.htmlDefaulted SBA EIDL Loans: In Reversal, U.S. to Heighten Efforts to Collect Billions in Unpaid Covid Loanshttps://shenwick.blogspot.com/2023/12/defaulted-sba-eidl-loans-in-reversal-us.htmlSBA EIDL Loan Defaults and the Statute of Limitations 12-24-2023https://shenwick.blogspot.com/2023/12/sba-eidl-loan-defaults-and-statute-of.htmlSBA EIDL Penalties if an SBA EIDL Loan is Not Repaidhttps://shenwick.blogspot.com/2023/12/sba-eidl-penalties-if-sba-eidl-loan-is.htmlMisuse or Misapply SBA EIDL Loan Proceeds and Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Filingshttps://shenwick.blogspot.com/2023/08/misuse-or-misapply-sba-eidl-loan.htmlSBA EIDL HARDSHIP PROGRA Mhttps://shenwick.blogspot.com/2023/07/sba-eidl-hardship-program.htmlDefaulted SBA EIDL Loans, Limited Liability Company (LLC) and Cancellation of Debt Income (COD) under Section 108 of the Internal Revenue Codehttps://shenwick.blogspot.com/2023/07/defaulted-sba-eidl-loans-limited.htmlOffers In Compromise ("OIC") for Defaulted SBA EIDL loans and Section 108 of the Internal Revenue Code ("IRC"), Relief of Indebted Income, a Trap for the Unwary!https://shenwick.blogspot.com/2023/05/offers-in-compromise-oic-for-defaulted.htmlEIDL LOAN WORKOUTS AND BANKRUPTCY https://shenwick.blogspot.com/2022/07/eidl-loan-workouts-and-bankruptcy.htmlEIDL Loan Default Questions & Answers https://shenwick.blogspot.com/2022/10/eidl-loan-default-questions-answers.htmlEIDL LOAN DEFAULT DOCUMENT REVIEW, WORKOUT, BANKRUPTCY FILING & OFFER IN COMPROMIS Ehttps://shenwick.blogspot.com/2022/07/eidl-loan-default-document-review.htmlEIDL Defaulted Loanshttps://shenwick.blogspot.com/2022/07/eidl-defaulted-loans.htmlNew Relief Program for SBA EIDL Borrowers Who are Having Difficulty Repaying EIDL Loans " Hardship Accommodation Plan"https://shenwick.blogspot.com/2023/05/new-relief-program-for-sba-eidl.htmlEIDL LOANS and SBA OFFER IN COMPROMISE PROGRA Mhttps://shenwick.blogspot.com/2022/07/eidl-loans-and-sba-offer-in-compromise.htmlPPP & EIDL Fraudhttps://shenwick.blogspot.com/2022/08/ppp-eidl-fraud.htmlBetter to connect-What small business owners need to know about repaying loans tied to pandemic relief from the SBA EIDL Loanshttps://shenwick.blogspot.com/2022/11/better-to-connect-what-small-business.html
N.C. Ct. of App.: Jhang v. Temple- Sufficiency of Service Ed Boltz Sun, 03/10/2024 - 00:13 Summary: On appeal, Templeton University asserted that service of a lawsuit was improper because it was not made to the appropriate office of an officer, director, or managing agent nor to an actual officer, director, or managing agent. The N.C. Court of Appeals rejected this, as service "does not require that the person upon whom summons is served be in fact in charge of the office of the officer, director or managing agent of the corporation, merely that the person be ‘apparently in charge’” with the evidence showing such apparent authority. Further, the responses filed by a non-attorney director for Templeton University were insufficient to contest service, as “a corporation must be represented by a duly admitted and licensed attorney-at-law and cannot proceed pro se. . . .” LexisNexis, Div. of Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Travishan Corp., 155 N.C. App. 205, 209, 573 S.E.2d 547, 549 (2002). To read a copy of the transcript, please see: Blog comments Attachment Document jhang_v._templeton_univ.pdf (141.48 KB) Category NC Court of Appeals NC Courts
4th Cir.: Protopas v. Travelers- Subject Matter Jurisdiction for State Receivership Ed Boltz Sat, 03/09/2024 - 23:04 Summary: A South Carolina court-appointed receiver for Payne & Keller Co, a defunct construction company facing asbestos litigation, brought an action against Travelers Casualty and Surety Company and other insurers, alleging breaches of insurance policies issued to a defunct company within a state receivership. Travelers removed the action to federal court, asserting diversity jurisdiction, but the district court granted the receiver’s motion to remand the case back to state court holding that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because The case involved property of a state receivership exclusively under the jurisdiction of the state court (based on the doctrine articulated in Barton v. Barbour), and The removal lacked unanimous consent of all defendants due to a forum selection clause in some of the insurance policies issued to the defunct company. Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. Commentary: Again, another in the recent trend of cases that were placed in state court receivership rather than filing a bankruptcy, involuntary or otherwise. Since Payne & Keller was actually a Texas corporation, it is disappointing that it failed to dance the Texas Two-Step like most other companies seem to do when facing this type of litigation, especially since Charlotte, the Queen City of Asbestos Bankruptcy, was barely a stone's throw away from Columbia. To read a copy of the transcript, please see: Blog comments Attachment Document protopas_v._travellers.pdf (172.37 KB) Category 4th Circuit Court of Appeals
4th Cir.: Mohamed v. Bank of America- Electronic Funds Transfers Act Ed Boltz Sat, 03/09/2024 - 19:14 Summary: Mohamed sued Bank of America alleging violations of the EFTA, particularly regarding unauthorized electronic fund transfers. The case centered on whether Bank of America properly provided notice of the right to cancel preauthorized electronic fund transfers, as required by the EFTA. Mohamed argued that the bank's notice did not comply with the law. The Court of Appeals found in favor of Mohamed, ruling that Bank of America's notice did not adequately inform consumers of their rights under the EFTA and by failing to provide adequate fraud prevention and investigation. Further, a "covered account" under the EFTA includes a prepaid account, including one loaded with unemployment assistance related to the pandemic such as a government benefit account. Commentary: Some of the main protections under the EFTA include: Disclosure Requirements: Financial institutions must provide consumers with clear and comprehensive disclosures regarding the terms and conditions of electronic fund transfer services, including fees, liability for unauthorized transactions, and procedures for resolving errors. Limits on Liability for Unauthorized Transfers: The EFTA limits a consumer's liability for unauthorized electronic fund transfers, provided the consumer promptly reports the unauthorized activity to the financial institution. Typically, the consumer's liability is capped at $50 if the report is made within two business days of discovering the unauthorized transfer. Error Resolution Procedures: Financial institutions are required to establish procedures for consumers to report errors related to electronic fund transfers, such as incorrect amounts or unauthorized transactions. Upon receiving a report, the institution must investigate and resolve the error promptly. Right to Stop Payments: Consumers have the right to stop preauthorized electronic fund transfers by notifying the financial institution at least three business days before the scheduled transfer date. Prompt Crediting of Deposits: Financial institutions must promptly credit electronic deposits, such as payroll direct deposits or electronic benefit transfers, to the consumer's account on the day the funds are received. Fair Treatment of Consumers: The EFTA prohibits unfair or deceptive practices by financial institutions in connection with electronic fund transfer services, ensuring consumers are treated fairly and transparently.These protections may apply in Chapter 13 cases, potentially in regard to electronic payments to Chapter 13 trustee but perhaps also in electronic transfers made by Chapter 13 Trustees, as the definition in the EFTA of a consumer's account could also include money that the Trustee holds, the definition of a financial institution could include Trustees themselves and the phrase preauthorized electronic fund transfer arguably includes those authorized under a voluntary Chapter 13 repayment plan. Could this mean that the EFTA apply and provides Chapter 13 debtors some degree of continuing control to stop payments? Similarly, does the EFTA require prompt crediting of payments received, again either from the debtor to the Chapter 13 trustee or from the Chapter 13 Trustee to a creditor? To read a copy of the transcript, please see: Blog comments Attachment Document mohamed_v._bank_of_america_1.pdf (157.45 KB) Category 4th Circuit Court of Appeals
Bankr. M.D.N.C.: In re Randolph Hospital I & II- Motion for Summary Judgment and Expert Witnesses in a Bench Trial Ed Boltz Sat, 03/09/2024 - 18:47 Summary (MSJ): The Liquidating Trustee sought judgment on his claims for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices against Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital Operating Corporation ("Cone Health), with both parties seeking summary judgment. Ranging over 76 pages, the bankruptcy court opinion regarding the numerous causes of action variously granted or denied the parties' Motions for Summary Judgment, with specific order also attached. Summary (Expert Witness): The bankruptcy court excluded portions of an expert witness's testimony to the extent that it involved conclusions as to a parties' legal responsibilities or its alleged breaches of the agreement, but otherwise overruled in all other respects. Fed. R. Evid. 702 (2023), specifically provides that: A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if the proponent demonstrates to the court that it is more likely than not that: (a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the expert’s opinion reflects a reliable application of the principles and methods to the facts of the case. . The application of Rule 702 here was "relaxed" as this case was to be decided by the bankruptcy judge, rather than by a jury, so "there is less need for the gatekeeper to keep the gate when the gatekeeper is keeping the gate only for himself." . See, e.g., United States v. Wood, 741 F.3d 417, 425 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Brown, 415 F.3d 1257, 1269 (11th Cir. 2005)). Commentary: While reading 94 pages about the contractual fights in a hospital bankruptcy is not immediately pertinent for most consumers attorneys, the second of these opinions does examine in detail the allowance of expert witnesses in bankruptcy cases, with it appearing that broad discretion, almost up to the point an expert providing legal opinions, should be given in bench trials, whether medical systems experts or, as an example more likely in a consumer context, for forensic mortgage accountants. Additionally useful is the discussion of the waivers of breaches of contract, which the bankruptcy court held requires: The waiving party is the innocent, or nonbreaching party; The breach does not involve total repudiation of the contract so that the nonbreaching party continues to receive some of the bargained-for consideration; The innocent party is aware of the breach; The innocent party intentionally waives his right to excuse or repudiate his own performance by continuing to perform or accept the partial performance of the breaching party. See Wheeler v. Wheeler, 263 S.E.2d 763, 766-767 (N.C. 1980). In consumer cases, the question of waiver touches on, for example, whether a reaffirmation is required. A waiver of a breach of contract, including perhaps the acceptance of payments after receiving notice of a breach of contract due to the filing of bankruptcy, could remove any event of default and make any reaffirmation an impermissible and unnecessary "undue hardship". Blog comments Attachment Document robichaux_v._cone_22-02002_-_order_re_objection_to_expert_reports.pdf (621.43 KB) Document randolph_cone_msj.pdf (403.22 KB) Category North Carolina Bankruptcy Cases Middle District
Law Review: Ponoroff, Lawrence- Chapter 13: Let’s Call the Whole Thing Off Ed Boltz Sat, 03/09/2024 - 18:40 Abstract: Courts cannot agree on much of anything about chapter 13, and legislators cannot agree and are confused over what to do about it. This state of affairs benefits no one and shows no signs of abating. So, in this Article, I propose to throw in the towel by imagining a world without chapter 13. Spoiler alert: although I am not superstitious, with just a few tweaks and tucks to chapter 7, I think the Bankruptcy Code might just be better off operating like a high-rise elevator that goes directly from floor twelve to floor fourteen. I will lay it out and readers can decide for themselves if they are prepared to become anti-choice. For me, in the words of the legendary Louis Armstrong, “and I think to myself what a wonderful world” it would be without chapter 13. Commentary: Perhaps the most glib (it's ever so fun to quote the lyrics of jazz standards!) and uninformed dismissal of Chapter 13 that I have read. The author, naive to the point of foolishness, suggests that debtors could save homes from foreclin Chapter 7 "by reaffirming the debt so long as the bank is amenable", but if banks were amenable the debtor could have avoided foreclosure. Further, to the extent that my commentary might seem unnecessarily insulting, the comments that "consumer bankruptcy attorneys may rush to the barricades to resist" because of their "avarice" seem to perpetuate the irrational and knee jerk hostitly all too common in the ivory tower. Perhaps that arises because consumer debtor attorneys do not, unlike their $2500 hour Chapter 11 colleagues, endow positions at law schools, underwrite self-serving scholarship, or pay for lavish cocktail parties at bankruptcy conferences. That disregard inaccurately persists with the statements in this article that Chapter 11 cases can "bear the overhead of litigating [bankruptcy] issues", when in fact far more bankruptcy issues (impacting all chapters) are raised and litigated, including on appeal as far as the Supreme Court, by consumer attorneys, almost always without charge, than by corporate debtor attorneys. See, e.g., Bankruptcy and the US Supreme Court by Ronald J. Mann. Lastly, for those fixated on the discharge being the sole gauge of the success of any bankruptcy, leaving aside unlikely changes such as the adoption of Senator Warren's Consumer Bankruptcy Reform Act or Prof. Ponoroff's myopic suggestion to simply "scrap" Chapter 13, there are immediate options that bankruptcy courts, trustees and the USTP (and Bankruptcy Administrator) could take to increase that metric, perhaps without any legislation. Most Chapter 13 cases fail due to delinquencies in plan payments, with Trustees moving, pursuant to 11 U.S. Code § 1307, to dismiss. That section, however, also provides that any party in interest can move to convert a case if that "is in the best interests of creditors and the estate". Obviously, liquidating an estate if there are non-exempt assets is in the best interest of creditors, but arguably the discharge of debts is also in the interest of creditors when there are neither assets or income that could be obtained outside of bankruptcy. Stopping creditors from expending their resources in pointless debt collection is to their benefit. (Except perhaps for those mythical "amenable" banks mentioned elsewhere by Prof. Ponoroff.) Further, by reducing the need for the debtor to refile another bankruptcy, paying the avaricious consumer debtor attorneys again, that preserves their ability to pay secured creditors. (11 U.S. Code § 1307 does not show a preference for secured or unsecured creditors.) Now obviously, many Chapter 13 debtors do convert their failing plans to Chapter 7, but a simple logistical fact, that many academics seem unaware of, is that a debtor must affirmatively convert their case to Chapter 7 and, absent the specific instruction, their attorney cannot take that action, no matter how advisable, unilaterally. In the face of a failing plan, many, many consumer debtors simply disappear and become non-responsive. But just as a consumer debtor's attorney cannot seek conversion absent instruction, the attorney also cannot oppose conversion absent instruction. So if instead Chapter 13 trustees and the USTP (and Bankruptcy Administrators) more uniformly and routinely sought conversion of cases to Chapter 7 (still subject to the debtor's absolute right to voluntarily dismiss a Chapter 13 case) those debtors would actually get a discharge. (A generous reading of 11 U.S. Code § 341 would even find no requirement for a second First Meeting of Creditors. What questions was the Chapter 13 Trustee derelict in failing to ask previously?) The author here does admittedly draw attention to one of the largest issues with conversion as a solution, viz. whether the post-petition appreciation in value in assets, particularly homes, can be sold by a Chapter 7 trustee. This problem arises only because of unmentioned avarice of Chapter 7 Trustees (as always, I stand in favor of finding ways to pay Chapter 7 Trustees more for "No Asset" cases) and because it's under the nose of the bankruptcy court. But how often does anyone care when a debtor sells their house for more money after receiving a discharge and closure of their case? Never. But Chapter 13 debtors, who had the temerity to take this "honorable" alternative, are punished for this under a draconian interpretation of § 348 and an overly broad reading of the difference from Schwab v. Reilly between exemptions for dollar amounts and those for a Ding an Sich (to get all Kantian here). The likelihood of any of these alternatives, however, is vanishingly small, especially compared with the certainty that ill-informed academics will continue to write unhelpful screeds about the failures of Chapter 13. To read a copy of the transcript, please see: Blog comments Attachment Document chapter_13_let_s_call_the_whole_thing_off_1.pdf (664.88 KB) Category Law Reviews & Studies
Few things are more stressful than getting a notice that your property is going to be sold at a sheriff’s sale. Unfortunately, many people are unaware of how much time they have before the sale. Fortunately, in Pennsylvania, you must be given time to address the situation before the sheriff’s sale. In some cases, this can be as short as a month. For this reason and many others, you need a legal team that understands the complexities inherent in these cases. We can help you form strategies to keep your property or arrange another agreement that satisfies your debts. Our firm will act as a barrier between you and your lenders, negotiating on your behalf and fighting to protect your rights. For a free case evaluation with our Pennsylvania bankruptcy lawyers, contact Young, Marr, Mallis & Deane at (215) 701-6519. How Much Notice Am I Entitled to Before My Property is Sold at a Pennsylvania Sheriff’s Sale? Sheriff’s sales in Pennsylvania are public auctions where properties subject to foreclosure or tax delinquency are sold. These sales serve as mechanisms for creditors to recover debts through the seizure and sale of a debtor’s property. However, you are entitled to be notified before your property is sold off. Our Pennsylvania property attorneys can help you determine how long you have before the sale and how to contest it. The following are the notice requirements that must be followed in a Pennsylvania sheriff’s sale: Act 91 Notice First, lenders are obligated to send an “Act 91” notice to the property owners at least 30 days before initiating a foreclosure action. This notice serves as an alert to the owners regarding the impending foreclosure and must provide them with relevant information about available assistance programs that can help them avoid foreclosure. Notice of Sale 231 Pa. Code § 3129.2 stipulates that the notice must be given through a combination of handbills, written notice to all interested parties, and publication in a newspaper of general circulation and a legal publication, if available. The timing and specifics of the notice may vary depending on local rules, but generally, notices must be posted and published several weeks in advance of the sale. This ensures that interested parties are aware of the sale and have ample time to prepare for it. Time Frame for the Sale Most importantly, property can be sold at a sheriff’s sale within a wide timeframe. However, this period typically begins 30 days after the judgment date but can last up to 5 years. This means that the property owner might have up to 5 years to pay off any outstanding debts or obligations before the sale takes place. Distribution of Proceeds After the property has been sold, the sheriff’s office is required to prepare a schedule of the proposed distribution of the proceeds within 30 days. This schedule usually outlines how the proceeds from the sale will be distributed among the parties involved in the case, including any outstanding debts or liens to be settled. What Property Can Be Sold at a Sheriff’s Sale in Pennsylvania? Unfortunately, the debtor’s personal and real property can be auctioned at a sheriff’s sale in Pennsylvania. However, some types of property are more in jeopardy of being sold than others. The following will help you understand what property could be in danger of being sold off if you receive a notice for a sheriff’s sale following foreclosure: Real Estate Properties One of the most common types of property sold at sheriff’s sales in Pennsylvania is real estate. This category typically includes residential homes, commercial buildings, and vacant land. The sale of real estate properties typically follows a judicial mortgage foreclosure process, initiated by creditors such as banks or financial institutions when your mortgage goes unpaid. This means that the bank or creditor filed suit against you and the sale was ordered by a judge. Keep in mind that this decision can be made by the court if you are absent from the hearing to address the foreclosure. Tax-Delinquent Properties Properties with unpaid taxes also frequently appear at sheriff’s sales, offering municipalities a path to recover unpaid property taxes. These sales are particularly important for local governments as they serve as a source of funding for public services. Properties sold for this reason range from residential homes to commercial establishments and undeveloped land. Personal Property Sheriff’s sales can extend beyond real estate to include personal property as well. Personal property can include a wide range of tangible assets, like vehicles, electronic devices, machinery, jewelry, furniture, and other valuable items. These sales will then be used to satisfy your outstanding debts or judgments against you. Unfortunately, this process provides ample opportunity for interested buyers to acquire your assets at a discount. Business Assets In cases involving business bankruptcies or judgments against businesses, assets of the business may be sold at a sheriff’s sale. These assets can include office furniture, inventory, company vehicles, and even intellectual property. The sale of business assets typically serves as a means to repay creditors or satisfy judgments awarded in civil litigation. Unique and Miscellaneous Properties Sheriff’s sales may occasionally feature unique or miscellaneous properties that do not neatly fit into the categories mentioned above. This can include items like boats, artwork, and collectibles. The inclusion of such items highlights the diversity of assets that can be liquidated through the sheriff’s sale process. Can I Contest a Sheriff’s Sale in Pennsylvania? Those facing the loss of their property through a sheriff’s sale could have several potential avenues to contest the sale or, at least, mitigate its consequences. For instance, filing for bankruptcy is one of the most immediate methods to halt a sheriff’s sale. Bankruptcy can stop a sheriff’s sale entirely if filed before the sale occurs, providing that the debtor cannot pay off the debt or negotiate other arrangements. If you file for Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 bankruptcy, the automatic stay it provides should halt all collection activities, including foreclosure and sheriff’s sales. A short sale is another strategy for homeowners seeking to avoid the worst repercussions of a sheriff’s sale. In a short sale, the homeowner sells the property for less than the amount owed on the mortgage with the lender’s approval. While not directly contesting the sheriff’s sale, a short sale can be a proactive approach to satisfy the debt for less than the full amount. The advantage of a short sale is its potential to limit the financial damage to your credit score compared to the impact of a foreclosure. Moreover, it provides a measure of control over the process, allowing you to be actively involved in the sale of your property. Our Pennsylvania Property Lawyers Can Provide the Guidance You Need Before Your Sheriff’s Sale Occurs Our Philadelphia bankruptcy attorneys at Young, Marr, Mallis & Deane can provide a free case review when you call us at (215) 701-6519.
N.C. Ct. of App.: Maxsiq v. Howard- Severability of Settlement Terms Stafford Patterson Fri, 03/08/2024 - 19:41 Summary: The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, which had granted summary judgment to the defendants, dismissing the plaintiff's claims for unjust enrichment and conversion. The case centered on the enforceability of a Memorandum of Settlement (MOS) after settlement negotiations failed, specifically whether a $1,000,000 initial payment made by the plaintiff to the defendants was refundable. The court held that the initial payment provision created a standalone agreement, independent of the MOS, and was non-refundable "in any event" according to its terms. The court also found that the initial payment was supported by consideration, making it an enforceable contract, and dismissed the plaintiff's claims accordingly. To read a copy of the transcript, please see: Blog comments Attachment Document maxisiq_v._howard_1.pdf (125.56 KB) Category NC Court of Appeals NC Courts
Small-business owners carry bigger debt loads than they did pre-pandemic Biz Journals is reporting that Small Business owners are now carrying bigger debt loads that they did pre-pandemic. The increased debt load combined with higher interest rates is proving to be a "toxic mix." At Shenwick & Associates, we are witnessing a significant rise in business bankruptcies, personal bankruptcy filings, and workouts.The Biz Journal article can be found athttps://www.bizjournals.com/orlando/news/2024/03/07/small-business-debt-loans-federal-reserve-interest.htmlJim Shenwick, Esq 917 363 3391 jshenwick@gmail.com Please click the link to schedule a telephone call with me.https://calendly.com/james-shenwick/15minWe held individuals & businesses with too much debt!